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So You Want to Have a Second Child? Second
Child Bias and the Justification-Suppression
Model of Prejudice in Family Responsibilities
Discrimination
KYLE C. VELTE†
INTRODUCTION
“Discrimination against pregnant women and
potentially affects every family in the United States.” 1

caregivers

“What is killing women today is motherhood. And that’s just
indefensible. In a country that is so committed to family values,
that is indefensible.”2
“Even if a new mother and her employer can cope with one child,
the second baby is often the final straw.”3

A senior female associate at a regional office of a
national law firm is the mother of a three-year-old boy. She
had handled complex litigation throughout her career—both
before and after having her first child—and had received
stellar performance reviews at every turn. Upon telling the
managing partner of the litigation section that she is
† LL.M., Harvard Law School; J.D., American University Washington College of
Law; Lecturer, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. A special thank you
to Cynthia Calvert, Chai Feldblum, Charlotte Sweeney, Kara Veitch, Ann
Vessels, Lindsey Webb, and Joan Williams for their helpful guidance and
feedback, and to Steven Reid and Candice Maybee for their excellent research
assistance.
1. Testimony of P. David Lopez, General Counsel to the EEOC, to meeting of
EEOC Commissioners, Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and
Workers
with
Caregiving
Responsibilities
(Feb.
15,
2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/transcript.cfm.
2. Testimony of Joan Williams, Founding Director, Center for WorkLife
Law, to meeting of EEOC Commissioners, Unlawful Discrimination Against
Pregnant Workers and Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities (Feb. 15,
2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/transcript.cfm.
3. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT
JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED 102 (2010).
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expecting her second child, her career at the firm comes to a
screeching halt. The managing partner tells her: “You are
welcome to come back to this firm after your second child is
born. But you will be off of the partner track and you will
have to come back as of counsel. With this second child, you
have hit the ceiling here.”4
A female, the mother of a two-and-a-half-year old child,
recently made partner at a regional litigation firm. She tells
the managing partners that she is expecting her second
child and then works until the day that she goes into labor.
On the first day she is back in the office after maternity
leave—a date well known to the managing partners—she
finds that there is no work for her. Over the next two years,
the partner is pushed to the margins of the firm, both in
terms of work assignments and decision-making. She is
relegated to associate-level and sometimes paralegal-type
work. She is told by a managing partner, prior to a client
meeting set for after working hours: “I know that you like to
go home right at five o’clock, so you don’t need to be at the
client meeting tonight.” She is later fired from the firm,
allegedly for performance reasons, although such reasons
have never been previously raised and in spite of her
performance reviews being consistently positive throughout
her seven years at the firm.5
These stories are stark examples of an emerging type of
family responsibilities discrimination (“FRD”) known as the
“second child bias.” FRD occurs when employees who are
also caregivers—most commonly, mothers—experience
employment discrimination based on their caregiving
activities and responsibilities. The discrimination results
from employers’ stereotypes and biases about women
generally and mothers in particular. The second child bias
(“SCB”) describes the circumstance where mothers report
little or no discrimination in the workplace until they have
their second child, at which time they experience FRD.

4. Experience of an associate at a regional office of a national law firm, as
told to the author.
5. Experience of a partner at a regional law firm, as told to the author.
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This article explores the prevalence and causes of SCB.
It argues that the second child bias arises from a discrete
and unique stereotype about mothers of more than one
child—what I will call the second child stereotype—by
employees, employers, attorneys, courts, law-makers, and
policy-makers. Naming this specific stereotype and the
resulting second child bias and recognizing its impact in the
employment discrimination context is important on several
levels. First, it is important on a legal level: employment
discrimination that results from the bias should be
recognized as a cognizable harm under Title VII and other
federal, state, and local laws. Its unique characteristics
should lead courts to conclude that a “comparator”6 is not
required in Title VII disparate treatment FRD cases
generally and in SCB cases specifically. While some courts
have begun to reach this conclusion in FRD cases (instead
holding that “stereotype” evidence is a sufficient substitute
for “comparator” evidence),7 recognizing the SCB will
advance the argument that comparators should not be
required in FRD cases. Second, it is important on a policy
level: introducing the concept of the SCB into the continuing
dialogue about employment discrimination will serve to
further deepen and broaden the understanding of
employers, legislators, and individuals about the nature of
discrimination and its manifestation. This understanding
will lead to more effective and efficient “fixes” to the
problem through employers’ internal policies, through
lawmaking and/or rulemaking, and through consciousnessraising in individuals. Third, it is important on a normative
level: naming the discrete second child stereotype and
resulting bias is a powerful tool in the larger fight to end
employment discrimination based on family responsibilities
because labeling previously hidden phenomena effects a

6. In a Title VII sex discrimination case, a “comparator” is an individual
who is similarly situated to the plaintiff in all ways except biological sex.
Comparator evidence traditionally has been required for a plaintiff to prevail in
a Title VII sex discrimination claim. See, e.g., Thomas v. Austal, U.S.A., L.L.C.,
829 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1173-74 (S.D. Ala. 2011).
7. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d
107, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2004).

912

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

shifting of norms, raises consciousness, and engenders legal
and social change.
Part I summarizes the state of the law for FRD claims,
as well as situates this project within the current body of
FRD legal scholarship. Part I also describes the current
data on SCB. Part II frames the SCB phenomenon within
the context of two psychological phenomena: implicit bias
and the Justification-Suppression Model of the expression of
prejudice. Part III argues the importance of recognizing the
second child stereotype and resulting SCB as a unique
manifestation of FRD. It grounds this explanation in the
work of Joan Williams and Nancy Segal,8 and within the
framework of Cary Franklin’s notion of the “malleability of
the ‘traditional concept’ of sex discrimination.”9 Part IV
concludes the article with a call for studies directed
specifically at gathering additional data on the SCB.
I. FROM THE “GLASS CEILING” TO THE “MATERNAL WALL:” THE
EVOLUTION OF FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION
A. The Current State of the Law
1. Family Responsibilities Discrimination Defined
Family responsibilities discrimination, sometimes
referred to as ‘caregiver discrimination,’ is an “umbrella
term for numerous kinds of workplace discrimination.”10 It
occurs when “an employee suffers discrimination at work
8. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 77, 80 (2003) [hereinafter Beyond the Maternal Wall].
9. See Cary Franklin, Inventing the “Traditional Concept” of Sex
Discrimination, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1373-78 (2012).
10. Debra S. Katz, Continuing Legal Education Seminar Report, American
Law Institute–American Bar Association Recent Developments: Sex
Discrimination and Family Responsibility Claims (Mar. 5, 2009),
http://kmblegal.com/publications/recent-developments-sex-discrimination-andfamily-responsibility-claims/; see also Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto,
Emerging Discrimination Claims: Family Responsibility Discrimination, in
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 505 (2008) [hereinafter Emerging Discrimination Claims].

2013]

SECOND CHILD BIAS

913

based on biases about how employees with caregiving
responsibilities will or should act.”11 FRD cases share these
common characteristics: (1) an employee alleges that her12
caregiving responsibilities triggered an adverse action; (2)
the adverse action occurred because of the employer’s
implicit biases or stereotypes concerning caregivers; and (3)
“smoking gun” evidence in the form of employers’
statements concerning the competency of caregivers
(usually mothers) in the workplace.13
The “maternal wall” is the most common type of FRD.
As described by Joan Williams and Nancy Segal, 14
“maternal wall” discrimination differs from “glass ceiling”
discrimination. For decades, women have litigated “glass
11. Katz, supra note 10; see also Cynthia Thomas Calvert, The New Sex
Discrimination: Family Responsibilities, 9 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER
& CLASS 33, 34-35 (2009) (“FRD occurs when an employee suffers an adverse
action that affects the terms and conditions of her employment based on
unexamined biases about how women with family caregiving responsibilities
will or should act.”).
12. While FRD claims certainly include male caregivers, the vast majority of
FRD cases involve women/mothers. In fact, between 88 and 92 percent of FRD
cases are filed by women. See Lauren Block Mullins, Balancing Work and
Family: How Does Family Responsibilities Discrimination Affect Career
Advancement? 15 (May 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rutgers
University) (on file with author); E-mail from Cynthia Calvert, Senior Advisor,
Center for Worklife Law, to the author (Mar. 8, 2013, 6:15 PM) (on file with
author). As a result, this article focuses on FRD and the SCB vis-à-vis women.
Moreover, while the author recognizes that FRD (and, presumably, the SCB)
impacts mothers differently depending on their race, ethnicity, sexual
orientation, and socio-economic position, the Article does not explore the
different impact of the SCB along these lines. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & HEATHER
BOUSHEY, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS & WORKLIFE L., THE THREE FACES OF
WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT: THE POOR, THE PROFESSIONALS, AND THE MISSING
MIDDLE
45,
57,
63
(2010),
available
at
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/pdf/threefaces.pdf [hereinafter
THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT]; Stephen Benard et al., Cognitive Bias
and the Motherhood Penalty, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1359, 1377-78 (2008) (discussing
the effect of sexual orientation and race on the motherhood penalty). Rather, the
Article’s goal is to introduce the concept of the SCB into the ongoing scholarly
dialogue concerning FRD. While an analysis of the intersection of race, sexual
orientation, socio-economic status and the SCB is important, it is outside the
scope of this Article.
13. Emerging Discrimination Claims, supra note 10, at 509.
14. Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 77.
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ceiling” cases, in which they argue that stereotypes based
on sex, and sex alone, produced employment discrimination
that thwarted them from attaining the highest levels of
their professions.15 In the last decade, however, a new type
of gender discrimination case has emerged: employment
discrimination cases brought by mothers based on
caregiving status rather than based on sex alone. These
plaintiffs experience discrimination “not because they are
women but because they are mothers.”16
The impacts of the maternal wall are real and have
potential effects on a vast number of working mothers.
While only 47 percent of mothers with children under the
age of eighteen participated in the work force in 1975, by
2007 that number had risen to 71 percent.17 A leading study
of professional women found that “mothers were 79 percent
less likely to be hired, 100 percent less likely to be
promoted, offered an average of $11,000 less in salary, and
held to higher performance and punctuality standards than
women with identical resumes but no children.”18 In short,
working women who become mothers will be viewed in a
different light than their childless colleagues as well as paid
far less than their childless colleagues.19
Moreover, social scientists estimate that mothers are
paid seven percent less for every additional child they
have.20 However, because this number is based on
individuals who worked the same number of hours, the
15. Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall:
Using Stereotyping and Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender
Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 287, 287-88 (2003).
16. Id. at 287.
17. ELLEN GALINSKY, KERSTIN AUMANN & JAMES T. BOND, FAM. & WORK INST.,
TIMES ARE CHANGING: GENDER AND GENERATION AT WORK AND AT HOME, 2008
NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING WORKFORCE 4, 5 (2011), available at
http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/reports/Times_Are_Changing.pdf.
18. THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT, supra note 12, at 58 (citing
Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is there a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1297, 1316, 1326 (2007)).
19. ROBERT W. DRAGO, STRIKING A BALANCE: WORK, FAMILY, LIFE 4 (2007).
20. Michele Budig & Paula England, The Wage Penalty for Motherhood, 66
AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 204, 204-05 (2001).
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figure significantly minimizes the cost of parenting. The
chief reason that becoming a mother negatively impacts
earnings is that women often reduce their working time
after having children or withdraw from paid work
altogether.21 Over the course of their lifetimes, middleincome working women who have children lose over a half a
million dollars in earnings, while women with a college
degree who have children lose more than a million dollars in
earnings.22
FRD is largely explained by the clash between the “ideal
worker” model and stereotypes and biases about women as
caregivers. The “ideal worker” is one who has no demands
outside of work, including no caregiving responsibilities,
such that he can dedicate himself completely to his work.23
The ideal is grounded in the “male model of work” that
assumes the presence of a stay-at-home wife and mother.24
21. JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY,
111-12 (Harvard University Press 2004).

AND GENDER INEQUALITY

22. Id. at 111.
23. PAMELA STONE, OPTING OUT? WHY WOMEN REALLY QUIT CAREERS
HEAD HOME 82-83 (University of California Press 2007).

AND

24. Id; see also DRAGO, supra note 19, at 10 (illustrating the “ideal worker”
norm with the following vignette: “[I]n many professional workplaces, if a man
announces that a new baby is on the way, he is typically congratulated. A
woman making the same announcement may similarly be congratulated, but
she will also likely be asked ‘how soon are you quitting?’ The presumption that
she will no longer seek to function as an ideal worker means that she had
crossed this particular line with a few simple words.”); id. at 52-53 (“I often take
my daughters to conferences and meetings as a way to integrate paid work and
family, and responses from colleagues have almost always been positive. It helps
that I am a man, because women often avoid bringing children in order to be
taken seriously as academics. When women take children to meetings, the
motherhood norm kicks in, and they risk being seen as less-than-ideal workers.
When men do the same thing, however, we are seen as fitting the ideal worker
norm, but with a cute hobby in the form of raising children.”).
The statistics about earnings losses for working mothers, coupled with the “ideal
worker” model belie the recent spurt of stories in the mainstream press that
professional women are voluntarily “opting out” of the workforce based on a
desire to embrace traditional caretaking roles at home. See STONE, supra note
23, at 82 (“As women talked about their jobs, the picture that emerged was not
about choices and options but about constraints and limits, about failed efforts
or about efforts that never got off the ground. On becoming mothers, women had
fewer and fewer alternatives. Their options narrowed; their ‘choice’ to quit,
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FRD is based on stereotypes and related biases rather
than on the performance of an individual employee.25 Biases
are the opinions or beliefs that affect a person’s ability to
make a particular, objective, and fair judgment or decision;
they are a personal opinion applied to a particular situation
or person.26 Stereotypes are oversimplified opinions that do
not account for individual difference. Stereotypes come in
several forms.27
“Descriptive” stereotypes are those that purport to
predict what men and women “will” do, such as the
assumption that mothers do not work as hard as other
employees and that men work harder than women in
general.28 These stereotypes arise from societal beliefs about
what men and women can do.29 Discrimination based on
descriptive stereotypes takes place when women are
considered incompetent to perform a “masculine” job.30 This
kind of discrimination thus can be reduced by learning more
about the individual woman in a particular job.

while ‘free’ was hardly ‘full.’ If family was the rock, the workplace was the hard
place of the double bind.”); id. at 101 (“Women’s reasons for quitting today
reveal that the time demands and inflexibility of professional occupations in
combination with the gendered nature of parenting create a kind of de facto
motherhood bar. Put differently, being a woman in a man’s world isn’t the
problem it used to be, being a mother is. From the reasons women give for
quitting, it is easy to divine the existence of a motherhood bar based on
workplace inflexibility.”).
25. Emerging Discrimination Claims, supra note 10, at 510-13; see also
Calvert, supra note 11, at 35 (“Assumptions and stereotypes are key elements of
most FRD cases.”).
26. Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, A Justification-Suppression
Model of the Expression and Experience of Prejudice, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 414,
416 (2003).
27. See id.
28. Joan C. Williams & Consuela A. Pinto, Family Responsibilities
Discrimination: Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, 22 LAB. LAW., 293, 296 (2007)
[hereinafter Don’t Get Caught Off Guard].
29. Stephen Benard & Shelley J. Correll, Normative Discrimination and the
Motherhood Penalty, 24 GENDER & SOC’Y 616, 619 (2010) [hereinafter Normative
Discrimination].
30. See id.
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“Prescriptive” stereotypes are ones that incorporate
notions of what women and men “should” or “should not” do,
such as when an employer terminates a new mother
because she “should” be at home to care for her baby.31
Similar to descriptive stereotypes, prescriptive ones dictate
that men act immodestly and with agency, while women act
communally but in an unassertive way.32 Prescriptive
stereotypes are based on norms; thus, people tend to
disapprove of those who violate them.33 Prescriptive
stereotypes can be “hostile”—“If you were my wife, I would
not want you working after having children”34—or can be
“benevolent”—such as when employers make decisions on
behalf of a mother-employee, based on uninvestigated
assumptions, such as when a top-performing lawyer was not
offered a promotion based on her employer’s assumption
that she did not want to travel.35
One such stereotype is that once a woman becomes a
mother, her competing interests—caregiving and working—
lead to a decline in the quality of her work. This stereotype
is sometimes called the “lack of fit”—an assumption that a
particular (usually high-powered)36 job is inappropriate for a
mother.37 It is also known as “role incongruity.”38 This
31. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 296-97.
32. Normative Discrimination, supra note 29, at 619.
33. Id. at 619-20 (“Men who do not behave agentically tend to be viewed as
unmasculine and subjected to a variety of sanctions. Similarly, women who do
behave agentically are evaluated negatively on a number of dimensions.”)
(citations omitted).
34. Id. at 621.
35. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 297.
36. For example, this kind of stereotyping is particularly prevalent in large
law firms. See Eli Wald, Glass Ceilings and Dead Ends: Professional Ideologies,
Gender Stereotypes, and the Future of Women Lawyers at Large Law Firms, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 2245, 2274 (2010) (“This specific stereotype is related to the
generic stereotype that women ought to stay at home and raise their children
but takes a life of its own in the context of the large law firm. Its emphasis is not
on care for children but rather disloyalty to the firm and its clients. . . . [T]he
assumption . . . [is] that those women lawyers are not paying enough attention
to their work and are distracted by their commitment to their role as mothers.”).
37. Katz, supra note 10, at 1; see also Benard et al., supra note 12, at 1367.
(“The lack of fit model begins with the observation that there is little overlap

918

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

stereotype is exemplified by the following question posed by
a supervisor to a subordinate attorney: do you want to be “a
successful mommy or a successful lawyer?”39 The stereotype
can lead to supervisors assuming that mothers have lower
competence,40 or in fact giving them lower performance
reviews than non-mothers.41
For those mothers who are able to work part-time or
flex-time after having children, a common stereotype is that
they are less committed to work than their full-time
colleagues.42 This stereotype about part-time or flex-time
working mothers can lead to what is known as “attribution
and leniency bias.”43 One illustration of this bias is in the
assumptions made when a worker is absent from the office:
when a part-time working mother is absent from the office,
it is assumed that she is with her children even if, in fact,
she is at an off-site business meeting. However, when a
childless working woman or working father is absent from
the office, it is not assumed that he or she is with children.44
This stereotype may lead to mothers receiving lower quality
work assignments as well as low performance reviews—
even when their performance is as strong as it was prior to
becoming mothers.45 One study showed that mothers are
between stereotypes about women and the stereotypical requirements of
traditionally male jobs.”).
38. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social
Science to Litigate Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 401, 43036 (2003).
39. Gallina v. Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, & Popeo, P.C., 123 F.
App’x. 558, 561 (4th Cir. 2005).
40. This is known as a ‘negative competence assumption’ which ‘assumes that
mothers are not as competent as women without children and men.’ See Don’t
Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 297.
41. See id. at 298.
42. Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 92, 97-98; see also Benard et
al., supra note 12, at 1379; THREE FACES OF WORK-FAMILY CONFLICT, supra note
12, at 54.
43. This ‘lack of commitment’ stereotype also affects mothers who work fulltime. See EEOC Guidance materials infra note 46.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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judged as significantly less competent than childless
women.”46
2. The Legal Landscape for Family Responsibilities
Discrimination Claims
Other scholars, in particular Professor Joan Williams of
the WorkLife Law Program at the University of California
Hastings College of Law, have written extensively about the
current legal landscape of FRD claims. These scholars have
provided extensive roadmaps to employees’ attorneys for
asserting FRD claims (and prophylactic advice for
management-side attorneys), including exhaustive reviews
of the types of claims that may be asserted by FRD
plaintiffs and the federal, state, and local statutes under
which such claims may be asserted.47 Because this
important work has already been done, the goal of this
Article is not to exhaustively describe the FRD landscape
for SCB claims. Rather, the article adds to the already
robust body of scholarship on FRD with the addition of the
new, discrete concept of the second child stereotype and the
resulting SCB. Therefore, this part includes only a brief
overview of the current state of the law for FRD claims.
There is no federal Equal Employment Opportunity
(“EEO”) statute that expressly prohibits FRD; those
statutes only prohibit discrimination based on a protected

46. See Shelly J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1297, 1316 (2007).
47. See
Family
Responsibilities
Discrimination,
WORKLIFELAW,
http://worklifelaw.org/pubs/FRD_Fact_Sheet.pdf (last visited March 1, 2013); see
also STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN & ROBERT J. RATHMELL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS &
WORKLIFE LAW, CAREGIVERS AS A PROTECTED CLASS?: THE GROWTH OF STATE AND
LOCAL LAWS PROHIBITING FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION, (Dec. 2009)
[hereinafter CAREGIVERS AS A PROTECTED CLASS?]; CYNTHIA THOMAS CALVERT,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & WORKLIFE LAW, FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES
DISCRIMINATION: LITIGATION UPDATE 2010 (2010) [hereinafter LITIGATION UPDATE
2010]; MARY C. STILL, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & WORKLIFE LAW, LITIGATING THE
MATERNAL WALL: U.S. LAWSUITS CHARGING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS
WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES (2006); Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8;
Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 296-97; Emerging Discrimination
Claims, supra note 10, at 515-33.
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characteristic, such as sex or race.48 However, FRD has been
recognized by courts when a worker with caregiving
responsibilities is discriminated against based on a
protected characteristic under federal EEO law.49 The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has
explained: “Although the federal EEO laws do not prohibit
discrimination against caregivers per se, there are
circumstances in which discrimination against caregivers
might constitute unlawful disparate treatment.”50
In fact, in 2007 the EEOC issued guidance on what it
calls “caregiver discrimination.”51 The guidance explains
that FRD discrimination can manifest, for example, when
an employer selects fathers, but not mothers, for a training
program.52 It further advises that FRD can occur when an
employer makes an assumption based on a stereotype, such
as when an employer assigns a less desirable project to a
mother based on the assumption that a mother is not as
committed to her job as is a father.53
The EEOC guidance also suggests that evidence about
stereotyping may be sufficient to prove discrimination, even
in the absence of a comparator or comparative evidence.54
48. Questions and Answers about EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on
Unlawful Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_caregiving.html (last updated May 23,
2007); see also Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving
Responsibilities,
EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-bestpractices.html (last modified Jan. 19, 2011); Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful
Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html (last modified Feb. 8, 2011).
49. See Enforcement Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers
with Caregiving Responsibilities, supra note 48.
50. Id.
51. Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities,
EEOC
(Jan.
19,
2011),
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-bestpractices.html.
52. See Emerging Discrimination Claims, supra note 10, at 510-11.
53. Id.
54. Id. (“All evidence should be examined in context. The presence or absence
of any particular kind of evidence is not dispositive. For example, while
comparative evidence is often useful, it is not necessary to establish a
violation.”). A “comparator” or “comparative evidence” traditionally has been
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Such stereotypes may provide sufficient evidence for a
plaintiff to prevail on a FRD claim, “even when an employer
acts upon such stereotypes unconsciously or reflexively.”55
The EEOC is on solid doctrinal ground in advising that
FRD claims may be proved by stereotype evidence rather
than comparator evidence. Over two decades ago, the
United States Supreme Court held that discrimination
based on sex stereotypes is prohibited under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
the Court held that Hopkins’ employer violated Title VII
when it denied her a promotion because she was negatively
perceived by her co-workers and supervisors for lacking
stereotypical feminine traits.56 These gender-nonconforming
traits included using profanity, being “aggressive,” brusque,
“unduly harsh,” and “impatient,” and having a “macho”
appearance.57 One supervisor advised her that, to get
promoted to partner, she should “walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up,
have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”58 The Court held:
“In the specific context of sex stereotyping, an employer who
required for a plaintiff to prevail in a Title VII sex discrimination claim.
Historically, courts have consistently demanded that “sex discrimination
plaintiffs produce opposite-sex comparators—individuals who are similarly
situated to themselves in all salient respects aside from biological sex.”
Franklin, supra note 9, at 1311. “This requirement has a devastating effect on
plaintiffs’ ability to win sex-based Title VII claims, as adequate comparators are
very rarely available in the contemporary workplace.” Id. This Article contends
that the ultimate adoption of the SCB by courts will continue to chip away at
the stronghold of the comparator “requirement.”
55. Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”:
Families Responsibility Discrimination and Developments in the Law of
Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1355 (2008); see also
Testimony of Joan Williams, supra note 2. (“A comparator in a caregiving case is
very often the same woman before she had kids. Often another comparator is
the treatment of women with children and the treatment of women without
children. . . . [O]ne of the dramatic things about these cases is that, although
nobody says ‘This is not a suitable job for a woman,’ unfortunately—this is the
need for outreach—people often say, ‘This is not a suitable job for a mother.’
That is evidence of discrimination, even in the absence of a comparator.”).
56. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 256 (1989).
57. Id. at 235.
58. Id.
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acts on the basis of a belief that a woman cannot be
aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis
of gender. . . . As to the existence of sex stereotyping in this
case, we are not inclined to quarrel with the District Court’s
conclusion that a number of the partners’ comments showed
sex stereotyping at work.”59 As for the legal relevance of sex
stereotyping, the court held:
We are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the
stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding
employers to discriminate against individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
60
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.”

More recently, in 2003, the Court again recognized that
gender stereotypes can lead to workplace discrimination;
this time, however, the Court recognized that principle in
the caregiving context. In Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, Mr. Hibbs requested leave from the
Nevada Department of Human Resources under the Family
Medical Leave Act to care for his ailing wife.61 Although the
employer granted the leave, Mr. Hibbs failed to return to
work after exhausting that leave, after which the
Department fired him.62 Mr. Hibbs sued the Department for
alleged violations of the FMLA.63
Although the question presented to the Court was
whether the FMLA was a valid exercise of Congress’s power
under the Fourteenth Amendment,64 the Court addressed
the issue of impermissible gender stereotyping in the
workplace.65 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist66
59. Id. at 250-51.
60. Id. at 251 (quoting Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n. 13 (1978)).
61. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003).
62. See id. at 725-26.
63. Id. at 725.
64. Id. at 725-26.
65. Id. At 728-32.
66. Justice Rehnquist, who is not known as a jurist sympathetic to gender
discrimination claims, came to this decision after he had to pick up his
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acknowledged that Congress, by enacting the FMLA, had
sought “to protect the right to be free from gender-based
discrimination in the workplace.”67 Moreover, continued the
majority, Congress had evidence that state-offered parental
leave for fathers was rare, and that “[t]his and other
differential leave policies were not attributable to any
differential physical needs of men and women, but rather to
the pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women’s work.”68 The Court then stated:
The impact of the discrimination targeted by the FMLA, which is
based on mutually reinforcing stereotypes that only women are
responsible for family caregiving and that men lack domestic
responsibilities, is significant. . . . Congress had already tried
unsuccessfully to address this problem through Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
Where previous legislative attempts have failed . . . such problems
may justify added prophylactic measures in response. . . . By
creating an across-the-board, routine employment benefit for all
eligible employees, Congress sought to ensure that family-care
leave would no longer be stigmatized as an inordinate drain on
the workplace caused by female employees, and that employers
69
could not evade leave obligations simply by hiring men.

Finally, and importantly for FRD claims, the majority noted
that the “faultline between work and family” is “precisely
where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest.”70
In holding that employers may not take adverse actions
against employees based on sex and gender stereotypes, the
Supreme Court has paved the road for successful FRD
claims, including, I argue, for SCB claims even in the
absence of a comparator. And, as seen below, FRD plaintiffs
have, in fact, been successful in claims based on stereotypes
as well as biases (both express and implicit),
grandchild from a child care facility because his daughter had to work. See Mike
Dorf, Federalism Versus Politics, DORF ON LAW (May 20, 2010),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/05/federalism-versus-politics.html.
67. Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
68. Id. at 731.
69. Id. at 722-23.
70. Id. at 738.
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notwithstanding the lack of comparator evidence. One
example is Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School
District,71 in which the holdings of Price Waterhouse and
Hibbs came together to support a trial court’s holding that a
plaintiff did not need to present comparator evidence where
her evidence of gender stereotyping was sufficient to prove a
prima facie case and survive summary judgment.72
Attorneys have asserted FRD claims under state and
local laws, as well as under the following federal statutes:
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII), the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Family
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act (“PDA”), and the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”).73 The most common FRD legal
theories under these statutes are: failure to hire; failure to
promote; denial of benefits; denial of or interference with
FMLA rights; retaliation for exercising FMLA rights; hostile
work environment; and wrongful discharge.74
a. Title VII
Disparate Treatment. Title VII is the most commonly
used statute in FRD cases.75 Title VII claims for sex
discrimination include “disparate treatment” claims and
“disparate impact” claims. FRD cases most often rely on
“disparate treatment” claims, under which an employer will
be found liable if the plaintiff proves intentional
discrimination of a protected class of employees (“sex” in the
FRD context).76 Employees can prove such intentional
discrimination with either direct evidence or with
circumstantial evidence.77
71. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 125-26
(2d Cir. 2004).
72. See id. at 120-21.
73. See generally Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28.
74. Emerging Discrimination Claims, supra note 10, at 514-15.
75. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 299.
76. Id. at 299, 308.
77. Green v. School Bd. of Hillsborough Cnty., Fla., 25 F.3d 974, 978 (11th
Cir. 1994).
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Plaintiffs relying on circumstantial evidence must
satisfy the three-pronged approach articulated in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.78 First, a plaintiff must
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.79 Second, the
defendant employer must produce evidence of a legitimate
non-discriminatory reason for its actions; if the employer
meets this burden, the presumption of discrimination
dissipates.80 Third, the plaintiff must present facts to show
an inference of discrimination, which the plaintiff may do by
presenting evidence that the defendant’s allegedly nondiscriminatory reasons are a pretext for discrimination.81
The ﬁrst prong of a prima facie case requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate that she is a member of a “protected
class.”82 In most FRD cases, “sex” is often not a meaningful
protected class because plaintiffs usually assert that they
were treated differently because they are women with
children or with caregiving responsibilities—rather than
receiving different treatment solely because they are a
woman—and women and men without these obligations are
treated differently.83 Thus, some FRD plaintiffs have
pursued the “sex-plus” theory of disparate treatment
established by the Supreme Court in Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp.,84 although the use of the “sex-plus” theory
has diminished in recent years as courts have become more
accepting of stereotyping theories.85 Regardless of the label
placed on the FRD claim, the key question in a disparate
78. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
79. Id. at 802.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 804.
82. Id. at 802.
83. See Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 299.
84. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 543-44 (1971). In
Martin Marietta, an employer refused to allow mothers of school-age children to
apply for jobs that were open to men with young children. The employer claimed
it did not discriminate against women because it hired women, provided they
did not have school-age children. The Supreme Court held that treating men
with children and women without children the same did not excuse
discrimination against women with children. See id.
85. See Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 300, 302.
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treatment claim is whether the plaintiff has put forth
sufﬁcient evidence to prove intentional discrimination based
on gender.86
As discussed above, Title VII law has developed such
that stereotypes about mothers or women as caregivers and
sex-based comments may constitute evidence of intentional
discrimination,87 even in the absence of comparator
evidence.88 This development of law concerning stereotypes
means that a plaintiff is no longer required to expressly rely
on a sex-plus theory: it is possible for plaintiffs to prevail in
FRD disparate treatment claims “simply by alleging that
they were discriminated against because they are mothers,
a subset of the protected class of women. Thus, the sex-plus
theory is no longer the only way to prove an FRD gender
discrimination claim.”89
Disparate Impact. In contrast to a disparate
treatment claim, a disparate impact claim does not require
a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent on the part of the
employer.90 FRD disparate impact claims under Title VII
require plaintiffs to show that certain facially neutral
policies have a disparate impact on female caregivers.91
86. See Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 642, 647 (2001).
87. See, e.g., Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d
107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that where there is evidence of gender
stereotyping, plaintiff need not put forth comparator evidence in order to prove
a prima facie case and survive summary judgment); Plaetzer v. Borton
Automotive, Inc., No. Civ. 02–3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL 2066770, at *6 n. 3 (D.
Minn. Aug. 13, 2004) (citing Back, 365 F.3d at 121) (holding that although
plaintiff did not allege a “sex-plus” claim, parental status is a plus factor where
the “employer’s objection to an employee’s parental duties is actually a veiled
assertion that mothers, because they are women, are insufﬁciently devoted to
work, or that work and motherhood are incompatible.” “[S]uch treatment is
gender based and is properly addressed under Title VII.”).
88. Back, 365 F.3d at 130.
89. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 302.
90. See Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 134.
91. See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)
(articulating the “business necessity” requirement in a race discrimination case;
holding that black plaintiffs stated employment discrimination claim under
Title VII where evidence demonstrated facially neutral hiring policies had
discriminatory effect on black workers).
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Examples include sick leave policies that prohibit workers
from using sick days to care for sick family members, limits
on leave or absences within a prescribed time period,
compensation structures that reward or penalize employees
based on the quantity of work rather than the quality of
work, and deﬁnitions of “full-time” work as requiring 50 or
more hours per week.92 Some FRD plaintiffs have
successfully pleaded disparate impact claims.93
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (“PDA”). The
PDA was added to Title VII in 1978.94 Pregnancy
discrimination complaints with the EEOC, which are a
large subset of FRD cases, have seen a 65 percent increase
between 1992 and 2007.95 The PDA directs that “women
affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated the same . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or

92. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 308. This definition of “full
time” work “excludes close to all mothers and, therefore, nearly 78% of working
women.” Id.
93. See, e.g., Garcia v. Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., 97 F.3d 810, 811-15 (5th Cir.
1996) (the plaintiff was a licensed vocational nurse who tried to return to her
position at a hospital after complications from her pregnancy required her to
miss approximately one month of work. Her employer refused to allow her to
return to work on the grounds that her pregnancy disqualiﬁed her from being
able to lift 150 pounds. The hospital had a policy prohibiting any employee from
returning to work after a medical leave with medical restrictions. A second
policy provided that employees on medical leave for more than six months were
subject to termination. The plaintiff would be in the eighth month of her
pregnancy at the end of the six months. The plaintiff argued that the lifting
requirement was artiﬁcial and that no nurse was actually required to lift that
amount as part of his or her work. The defendant claimed that lifting 150
pounds was a bona ﬁde job requirement, but admitted that it did not test any
current employees or job applicants to determine whether they could perform
this task. After trial, the court granted the hospital’s motion for judgment on the
basis that the plaintiff had failed to make out a claim for disparate treatment.
On appeal, the case was remanded for consideration under the disparate impact
theory, even though plaintiff had not provided any statistical comparison
demonstrating a disparate impact).
94. See 42 U.S.C. §2000(e)(k) (2006).
95. NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
ACT: WHERE WE STAND 30 YEARS LATER 2 (2008), available at
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/Pregnancy_Discrimination_
Act_-_Where_We_Stand_30_Years_L.pdf.
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inability to work.”96 The PDA was enacted to rebut the
assumption that women are less desirable employees
because they may become pregnant, as well as to preserve
for every woman the choice of whether to work while
pregnant.97 Under the Act, an employer may not take
adverse action against a pregnant employee based on an
assumption that she will not be able to fulﬁll a job’s
expectations.98 By definition, all PDA cases are FRD cases
because pregnant women are caregivers. Thus, PDA claims
have been successfully asserted in numerous FRD cases.99
Retaliation. “FRD retaliation cases require the same
elements of proof as a general Title VII retaliation claim.”100
These elements are: (1) the plaintiff engaged in a protected
activity (such as filing an informal complaint to supervisors,
engaging in an internal grievance procedure, filing a charge
of discrimination, or bringing suit), (2) an adverse
employment action occurred (such as firing, failure to
promote, reassignment with vastly different responsibilities,
or a major change in benefits), and (3) a causal link exists
between the protected activity and the adverse employment
96. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 303; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
97. Maldonado v. U.S. Bank, 186 F.3d 759, 762 (7th Cir. 1999) (quoting
Sheehan v. Donlen Corp., 173 F.3d 1039, 1044-45 (7th Cir. 1999) and Int’l
Union, United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206
(1991)).
98. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 303.
99. See, e.g., Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1154-55 (8th
Cir. 2003), in which plaintiff alleged she was subjected to a hostile work
environment in violation of the PDA because she was a woman who had been
pregnant and taken maternity leave, and may become pregnant again. Id. at
1154. After she returned from maternity leave, her supervisor told her “you
better not get pregnant again,” threw a telephone book at her with instructions
to ﬁnd a pediatrician who was open after hours, scrutinized her hours, increased
her workload without additional pay, and posted notes on her cubicle when she
was absent stating her child was sick. Id. at 1155. The defendant argued Walsh
was alleging parent or caretaker discrimination, which is not protected by Title
VII. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding sufﬁcient evidence to support a jury
verdict for plaintiff based on a violation of the PDA. Id. at 1158-62. The Center
for WorkLife Law’s database of cases contains approximately 3,300 cases, and
most of them are PDA cases; plaintiffs have succeeded in more than half of PDA
cases. See E-mail from Cynthia Calvert, supra note 12.
100. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 306.
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action.101 The Supreme Court’s broad deﬁnition of “adverse
action” in the 2006 retaliation case of Burlington Northern
and Santa Fe Railway Company v. White102 (“BNSF”) has
impacted FRD retaliation claims.
In BNSF, the Court defined the harm required to
demonstrate that an employment action was “adverse” in
order for the plaintiff to prevail in a retaliation claim.103 The
Court articulated the following standard: “[A] plaintiff must
show that a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse” in light of the
particular circumstances surrounding the action, which
means that the challenged action “well might have
‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination.’”104 The result of this standard is
that a lateral transfer, which under prior retaliation case
law would not have been actionable as an “adverse action,”
may in some instances be a materially adverse action to
state a cognizable claim under Title VII. To illustrate this
concept, the Court used a family responsibility example: it
noted that while a change in a worker’s schedule in many
instances would make little difference to an employee (and
thus not be materially adverse), such a change could
“matter enormously” to a mother with school-age children,
thus rendering the schedule change a materially adverse
action.105
The Court’s use of this caregiver example raises the
possibility that other actions in the caregiver discrimination
setting will be considered ‘adverse,’ and thus expand the
situations in which a plaintiff may prevail in an FRD
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
102. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62-68 (2006).
103. Id. at 68.
104. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
105. Id. at 69. The Court thus adopted the ﬁndings in Washington v. Ill. Dep’t
of Revenue, 420 F.3d 658, 659-663 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding, in race
discrimination/retaliation case where plaintiff worked ﬂexible schedule to care
for her son with Down syndrome, that plaintiff could support retaliation claim
with evidence that defendant forced her into a lateral transfer that required a
standard schedule; court noted that while such transfer is not ordinarily an
adverse action, for plaintiff, the change was signiﬁcant).
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retaliation case. Examples of other actions that could be
adverse to caregivers include transferring an employee to
an office that results in a longer commute, putting an
employee on a rotating schedule, or ceasing an employee’s
telecommuting arrangement.106 The application of the BNSF
deﬁnition of “adverse action” to FRD cases will be an
important issue to watch in the future.
b. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”)
The FMLA permits eligible employees of employers
covered by the Act to take unpaid, job-protected leave for
specified family and medical reasons.107 Eligible employees
are entitled to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a
twelve-month period for: (1) the birth of a child and to care
for the newborn child within one year of birth; (2) the
placement with the employee of a child for adoption or
foster care and to care for the newly placed child within one
year of placement; (3) to care for the employee’s spouse,
child, or parent who has a serious health condition; or (4) a
serious health condition that makes the employee unable to
perform the essential functions of his or her job.108
An FRD plaintiff may state a claim under the FMLA
when she gives birth to or is the caregiver for an ill family
member and suffers some adverse consequence as a
result.109 FRD plaintiffs have been successful in bringing
cases under both types of FMLA claims: interference with
FMLA rights and retaliation for exercising FMLA rights.110
106. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 307.
107. See Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 147.
108. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2009).
109. See Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 147-48.
110. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 310-12; see also Liu v.
Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1132-38 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that defendantemployer interfered with plaintiff’s FMLA leave by pressuring her to reduce her
leave and using her leave as negative factor in company’s decision to terminate
her; while on maternity leave, plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly pressured her to
reduce her leave time); Batka v. Prime Charter, Ltd., 301 F. Supp. 2d 308, 31417 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding plaintiff’s evidence—that supervisor became
antagonistic toward her and critical of her work after she told him that she was
pregnant and intended to return to work at the end of her maternity leave, that
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c. Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
The ADA prohibits workplace discrimination on the
basis of disability.111 The EEOC has interpreted the ADA’s
“association” provision to prohibit discrimination targeted
at a mother or other caregiver who takes time off from work
to care for a family member with a disability.112 Thus, FRD
plaintiffs have been successful in bringing ADA claims
where they prove that they were discriminated against
because they care for a person with a disability.113 However,
a hurdle in using the ADA to prevail in an FRD case is that
the family member needing care must be an individual with
a “disability” as deﬁned by the ADA.114 Some FRD plaintiffs
have succeeded in asserting caregiver claims under the
ADA.115
while on leave defendant sent her a severance package, and she was terminated
two weeks before she was scheduled to return from FMLA leave—defeated
defendant’s summary judgment motion on plaintiff’s FMLA retaliation claim).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2009).
112. Questions and Answers about the Association Provision of the Americans
with Disability Act, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/association_ada.html (last
modified Feb. 2, 2011).
113. See Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 149.
114. An individual is “disabled” under the ADA if the person has “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or [has been]
regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2009). This hurdle
is less significant since the ADA was amended in January 2009 to expand the
scope of the definition of disability. See Questions and Answers on the Final Rule
Implementing
the
ADA
Amendments
Act
of
2008,
EEOC,
http://www1.eeoc.gov//laws/regulations/ada_qa_final_rule.cfm?renderforprint=1
(last visited June 16, 2013); see also The ADA Amendments Act of 2008:
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/faqs/ADAfaqs.htm (last visited June
16, 2013).
115. See, e.g., McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 325-27 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (denying defendant-employer’s motion for summary judgment on
plaintiff-employee’s ADA association clause based on plaintiff’s allegations that
defendant involuntarily transferred her from full-day teaching position to halfday teaching, half-day resource aid position after birth of her disabled son, that
a less qualiﬁed teacher without a child was selected to ﬁll her full-time position,
and evidence of discriminatory animus against working mothers and mothers of
children with disabilities by principal of the school; plaintiff relied on “sex-plus”
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d. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(“ERISA”)
ERISA has been used by FRD plaintiffs in three
circumstances: “(1) to challenge refusals to hire or
terminations based on employers’ fears of high health
insurance premiums where employees’ dependents have
serious medical conditions; (2) to obtain pension credits
denied them due to personnel policies that required them to
stop working if they became pregnant; and (3) to [challenge]
an employer’s decision to terminate a pregnant employee to
prevent her from using maternity leave beneﬁts.”116 These
causes of action are brought pursuant to section 510 of
ERISA, which states in relevant part: “It shall be unlawful
for any person to discharge, ﬁne, suspend, expel, discipline,
or discriminate against a participant or beneﬁciary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the
provisions of an employee beneﬁt plan . . . or for the purpose
of interfering with the attainment of any right to which
such participant may become entitled under the plan. . . .”117
e. The Equal Pay Act (“EPA”)
The EPA prohibits wage discrimination on the basis of
sex.118 To state a successful EPA claim, a plaintiff must
show that the employer paid men and women different
wages for performing “equal work” in jobs that require
substantially “equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and
which are performed under similar working conditions.”119
In FRD cases, a plaintiff may be able to state an EPA claim
“[when her] employer pays part-time employees less than
their full-time counterparts who are performing essentially
the same job and where part-time workers are
theory of discrimination, alleging that transfer was based on unfounded
stereotypes concerning role of mothers of disabled children).
116. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 315-16.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2007).
119. Graham v. Texasgulf, Inc., 662 F. Supp. 1451, 1464 (D. Conn. 1987)
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)).
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disproportionately represented by women and/or women
with children.”120
It is not just part-time working mothers who may have
EPA claims. EPA claims that might be asserted by full-time
working mothers include (1) lower pay for the same work as
a non-mother, (2) denial of bonuses after returning to work
from maternity leave, and (3) pay cuts upon return to full
time work after taking maternity leave.121
f. State and Local Causes of Action
There are a number of state and local laws that
expressly cover FRD claims. As of 2009, there were at least
63 local laws in 22 states that “go beyond state and federal
law to expressly prohibit discrimination at work against
those who are also caregivers at home.”122 Several states are
considering
legislation
that
would
add
“family
responsibilities” to their anti-discrimination statutes.123
In addition to state and local statutes, state common
law is also a significant source of FRD law. Plaintiffs have
asserted FRD claims for wrongful discharge, breach of
contract, tortious interference with contract, infliction of

120. Don’t Get Caught Off Guard, supra note 28, at 318; see also Lovell v.
BBNT Solutions, LLC, 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 614-16, 621 (E.D. Va. 2003)
(rejecting application of “categorical rule” barring comparisons between parttime and fulltime workers because “such a rule would allow an employer to
avoid the EPA’s strictures by simply employing women in jobs with slightly
reduced-hour schedules and paying them at a lower rate than their male
counterparts”; plaintiff alleged defendant violated EPA by compensating her, a
part-time female employee who had recently returned from maternity leave, at
a lower rate than a full-time male employee who performed equal work).
121. See, e.g., EEOC v. Lumpy LLC, No. CV-06-0830-PHX-SRB, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 123674, at *20-21 (D. Ariz. 2008) (denying, in part, defendant’s
motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s EPA and Title VII claims; holding
plaintiff’s evidence that her supervisor told her that “she could renegotiate her
salary after he pregnancy” along with evidence that plaintiff was “compensated
at a rate below that afforded to her male counterparts” created question of fact
to defeat summary judgments against some, but not all, defendants).
122. CAREGIVERS AS A PROTECTED CLASS?, supra note 47, at 1.
123. See generally CAREGIVERS AS A PROTECTED CLASS?, supra note 47.
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emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and promissory
estoppel.124
g. Executive Order 13152
On May 2, 2000, then-President Clinton signed
Executive Order 13152. The Order amended EEO law for
federal
employees
by
prohibiting
employment
discrimination based on a federal employee’s “status as a
parent.”125 This category includes biological parents,
adoptive parents, foster parents, stepparents, legal
custodians, in loco parentis, and those who are in the
process of seeking custody or adoption.126 Though the
remedies are more limited than those available under
statutes,127 it is nonetheless another avenue for federal
employees to pursue for relief from FRD.
h. Key Holdings in Family Responsibilities
Discrimination Cases
The following is a summary of some of the key holdings
in FRD cases over the past decade.
• A jury awarded a woman who was pregnant with
twins, and who was already a mother to two young children,
over $2 million after her employer: (1) placed her on
immediate, involuntary and unpaid medical leave within an
hour of learning of her pregnancy; (2) rejected her
application for another position in the company; (3) ignored
her doctor’s express statement that she could continue to
work; and (4) terminated her.128
124. E-mail from Cynthia Calvert, supra note 12.
125. Exec. Order No. 13152, 65 Fed. Reg., 26,115 (May 2, 2000); see
CAREGIVERS AS A PROTECTED CLASS?, supra note 47, at 4.
126. Exec. Order No. 13152, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,115 (May 2, 2000).
127. The remedies include a commitment that the unlawful conduct will cease
and corrective action will take place; that an equivalent job placement will be
provided; that there will be make-whole relief for lost earnings; and the
possibility of recovering reasonable attorney fees. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.501(a)(1)(5), (e) (2012).
128. Lopez v. Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc., No. A119263, 2009 WL 1090375, at
*1-6 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2009).
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• A court of appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment to an employer-defendant, holding that
the then-pregnant plaintiff has established a prima facie
case of discrimination by showing that the employer: (1)
made comments reflecting a belief that plaintiff would not
return to work following maternity leave; (2) informed
plaintiff that he would not have hired her had he known
that she would be taking maternity leave so soon; and (3)
suggested that she use the company’s phones to look for a
new job.129
• A pregnant employee prevailed on summary judgment
after showing that her employer terminated her for pretextual reasons—for allegedly violating a “no call/no show
policy”—because other non-pregnant employees were not
terminated for violating the policy.130
• A working mother was awarded over $1 million in
damages in a failure to promote case after proving that her
employer: (1) admitted she was qualified for the promotion;
but (2) assumed that she did not want the promotion
because she had children and he assumed she did not want
to relocate her family; and (3) stated, when asked by
plaintiff why she was not promoted: “[because] you have
kids.”131
• A working mother with four children survived her
employer’s motion for summary judgment after showing
that her supervisor (1) scheduled her for erratic work hours
instead of a set schedule, (2) made comments about how his
wife did not have childcare problems, (3) kept notes on her
“offenses,” which he did not do with other employees, (4)
told her that she should “do the right thing” and stay home
with her children, and (5) told her that, as a woman with a

129. Frederickson v. Noble Venture, No. A05-1107, 2006 WL 696471, at *1-2
(Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2006).
130. Garcia v. Monument Mgt. Group, No. 4:05CV3139, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
32218, at *4-5 (D. Neb. 2006).
131. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 2d 973, 981-82 (W.D. Wis. 2003), aff’d,
383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004). The damages award was later reduced.

936

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

family, she would always be at a disadvantage in the
company.132
• A court held that use of stereotypical assumptions
about a mother’s commitment to her job, standing alone,
constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII in a
case where the plaintiff showed (1) she had received
outstanding performance reviews until she became a
mother, (2) that she was denied tenure because of her
family responsibilities, and (3) that her supervisors made
comments such as it was “not possible” for her “to be a good
mother and have this job,” and that they “did not know how
she could perform her job with little ones.”133
• A jury awarded a working mother $625,000 in
damages after she proved that, upon her return from
maternity leave, her employer (1) scrutinized her work
hours when no other employee’s hours were scrutinized, (2)
refused to allow her to leave to pick up her sick child from
daycare, and (3) threw a phone book at her with a direction
to find a pediatrician who was open after hours.134
The number of FRD cases has skyrocketed in the past
decade. The Center for WorkLife Law has documented a 400
percent increase in FRD claims in the last decade as
compared to the prior decade.135 This increase in FRD cases
(in contrast to the steady decrease in the number of other
employment discrimination cases filed in federal district
courts since 1998)136 is attributed to several factors,
including an increase in the number of working mothers, an
increased awareness of employees of their rights (likely
driven by the media), and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,

132. Plaetzer v. Borton Automotive, Inc., No. Civ.02–3089 JRT/JSM, 2004 WL
2066770, at *1, 11 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 2004).
133. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 114-17
(2d Cir. 2004).
134. Walsh v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1155 (8th Cir. 2003).
135. STILL, supra note 47, at 7; LITIGATION UPDATE 2010, supra note 47, at 9;
see also testimony of Joan Williams, supra note 2 (“The Center for WorkLife
Law has run a caregiver hotline for over a decade, and we have a database of
over 3,000 caregiver discrimination cases.”).
136. LITIGATION UPDATE 2010, supra note 47, at 9.
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which increased the availability of damages and jury
trials.137
B. What the Maternal Wall Teaches Us About the Second
Child Bias: Situating the Present Article Within the Current
Body of Family Responsibilities Discrimination Scholarship
Much has been written about FRD over the past decade,
resulting in a robust body of legal scholarship on this issue.
This scholarship has been descriptive and prescriptive. 138
This Article fits within the existing body of FRD scholarship
by articulating an emerging and discrete form of FRD—the
SCB—and arguing that recognizing SCB will advance the
struggle to end FRD in significant normative, legal and
social ways.
First, this Article builds on and adds to the
comprehensive survey of FRD contained in Joan Williams’s
and Nancy Segal’s 2001 article, Beyond the Maternal Wall:
Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against
on the Job.139 It expands the kinds of FRD claims by defining
and describing the SCB—including its causes and
manifestations—by describing the status of SCB cases in
current precedent and explaining the importance of
expressly recognizing the SCB as a discrete subset of FRD.
Second, it fits squarely within the newly carved-out
space within Title VII scholarship and jurisprudence
created by Cary Franklin’s 2012 article, Inventing The
“Traditional Concept” of Sex Discrimination.140 Franklin’s
article describes the common observation by courts, when
137. Id.
138. While scholars tend to agree about the prevalence and problem of FRD,
there is disagreement among scholars about the “right” approach to addressing
FRD. Compare Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment
Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic
and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (2001), and Beyond the
Maternal Wall, supra note 8, with Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 115. HARV L. REV. 642 (2001), and Mary Becker, Caring for
Children and Caretakers, 76 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV 1495 (2001).
139. 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 77 (2003).
140. 125 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2012).
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interpreting and applying Title VII in sex discrimination
cases, that Title VII has no legislative history concerning
the scope and meaning of “sex” discrimination and the
resulting position of courts that discrimination “based on
sex” must be restricted to a “traditional concept” of sex
discrimination.141 She describes this “traditional concept” of
sex discrimination as referring only to practices that
“divided men and women into two groups, perfectly
differentiated along biological sex lines.”142 The result of this
“traditional concept” approach would be the failure of a
plaintiff’s Title VII sex-discrimination claim unless the
plaintiff could produce the perfect comparator and then
prove the discrimination.143
Franklin then reviews the historical events—legal,
social, and political—surrounding the enactment of Title
VII’s “because of sex” provision and concludes that the
“traditional concept” of sex discrimination long-relied-on by
courts is, simply, an “invented tradition.”144 She notes that,
even today, this “traditional concept” of sex discrimination
impacts Title VII common law by encouraging the
continuing demand by courts that sex discrimination
plaintiffs produce opposite-sex comparators.145 “This
requirement has a devastating effect on plaintiffs’ ability to
win sex-based Title VII claims, as adequate comparators are
very rarely available in the current workplace.”146 Courts’
adherence to the invented “traditional concept” of sex
discrimination leads to a rejection by the judiciary of
“normative considerations [that] should influence the
determination of what counts as discrimination ‘because of
sex.’”147 Put another way, courts’ insistence that Congress
141. Id. at 1317.
142. Id. at 1309.
143. See id. at 1367.
144. See id. at 1311-15 (An “invented tradition” “[refers] to social practices
that purport to be old, or imply continuity with the past, but are actually quite
recent in origin.”).
145. Id. at 1311.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1359.
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defined “discrimination” objectively, by reference to formal
policies and practices, results in court decisions that restrict
Title VII’s reach in sex discrimination claims by ignoring
social considerations and value judgments that, if
considered, would expand the definition of what “counts” as
sex discrimination.148
Franklin next argues that in contrast to courts’
stubborn lip-service to the limiting “traditional concept” of
sex discrimination, in actuality, courts have “never
consistently adhered to an anti-classification conception of
sex discrimination.”149 She uses the “sex-plus” doctrine of
Title VII to demonstrate that the concept of sex
discrimination under Title VII is, in fact, malleable and not
rigidly confined to the “traditional concept” of sex
discrimination.150
Franklin concludes that the “traditional concept” of sex
discrimination articulated by courts over the past 35 years
is itself a legal fiction, and is merely just one argument in a
lengthy and continuing deliberation about the extent to
which Title VII should push back on cultural norms that
dictate distinct family roles based on gender.151 As a result,
the contours of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination
have never been stable.152
In illustrating the malleability of Title VII’s “because of
sex” provision, Franklin’s article creates normative and
doctrinal space for the articulation and recognition of
additional FRD theories and claims. My description of the
second child stereotype and resulting SCB, and argument
148. See id. at 1359-60. Because this traditional concept approach uses a
“formalistic conception of discrimination” by only being concerned with whether
a challenged employment practice “sorts men and women along the axis of
biological sex[,]” it is not concerned with “the social meaning or practical effects
of the challenged employment practice.” Id. at 1368.
149. Id. at 1373.
150. See id. at 1373-74.
151. See id. at 1378-80.
152. See id. at 1378-79; see also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S.
75, 79 (1998) (holding that same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under
Title VII, thus illustrating that what “counts” as sex discrimination is
malleable).

940

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

for its express recognition within the FRD framework, fills
in some of the space created by Franklin’s malleability
theory of Title VII’s sex discrimination provision. And the
assertion of the SCB theory as a claim in Title VII cases will
add to and further the “long-standing, and ongoing, debate
about how hard Title VII should press against the social
norms” of sex roles in families.153 Injecting the SCB into the
dialogue about social norms, stereotypes, and Title VII will
put another arrow in Title VII’s quiver and take aim at both
the nuanced, often implicit, second-child stereotype, and the
resulting destructive and discriminating second child bias.
C. The Prevalence of Second Child Bias Claims
There appear to be no published court decisions that
asserted a claim under a theory specifically described as a
“second child bias.” While some cases, discussed below,
addressed factual scenarios that involved a claim of
discrimination after the birth of a woman’s second child, no
party or court labeled that claim using the rubric of “second
child bias.” The Article argues below that recognizing the
SCB as a unique bias arising out of a discrete stereotype,
and carving out a specific claim for the SCB, is an important
project for legal and normative reasons.154
Notwithstanding the paucity of claims specifically
characterized as the SCB, other sources indicate that such a
bias exists, and that claims specific to the bias are
emerging. For example, recent articles aimed at
practitioners and human resources professionals have
mentioned the SCB as one of three “key case trends” in
FRD.155 One of these publications describes the emergence of
153. Id. at 1380.
154. See infra Part III.
155. See, e.g., LITIGATION UPDATE 2010, supra note 47, at 2-3; Charlotte N.
Sweeney & Rachel E. Ellis, Family Responsibility Discrimination: Enforcing the
Rights of Caregivers in the Workplace, 41 COLO. LAW. Oct. 2012, at 39; John
Hyman, Caregiver Discrimination, Three Years Later, OHIO EMPLOYER’S LAW
BLOG (May 6, 2010), http://www.ohioemployerlawblog.com/2010/05/caregiverdiscrimination-three-years.html; see also Sylvia Hsieh, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers,
EEOC See Rise in Pregnancy Bias Claims, NEW ENGLAND IN HOUSE (Mar. 21,
2012), http://newenglandinhouse.com/2012/03/21/plaintiffs%E2%80%99-lawyers-
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the SCB: “Plaintiffs’ lawyers also say they are noticing more
claims from women pregnant with their second child. ‘For
executives or higher paying jobs, employers assume a
woman with two children will either be less dedicated to her
work or that she may quit, so they pull back on
opportunities.’”156 At least one law firm is counseling its
clients to be aware of the SCB in a PowerPoint presentation
titled
“EEOC
Priorities:
Family
Responsibility
Discrimination, Systemic Claims, etc. Are You Ready to
Litigate with the EEOC?”157 In addition, the mainstream
press has begun to discuss the SCB.158 This Part presents
evidence of the SCB through anecdotal evidence, case law,
and social science research.
1. Anecdotal Evidence of the Second Child Bias.
“Conventional wisdom has it that two children
constitute a kind of tipping point in favor of domesticity.”159
The impetus for this Article arose from the author’s
experience with friends and colleagues in the field of law.
Upon entering the legal profession, and for nearly the first
decade of practice, the author and most of her female
friends and colleagues in the law excelled, experienced
meaningful professional growth, and, for the most part,
believed that, perhaps, we had finally “made it” across the
eeoc-see-rise-in-pregnancy-bias-claims/; Tim Gould, Family Responsibility
Discrimination: New Legal Minefield for HR, HRMORNING (Sep. 7, 2012),
http://www.hrmorning.com/new-legal-threat-family-responsibilitydiscrimination/; Michelle Ballard Miller, Family Responsibility Cases on the
Rise: Best Practices Can Avoid a Claim, BLOOMBERG L. (2011),
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/family-responsibility/;
Joanne Deschenaux, Costs of Family Responsibilities Discrimination Increasing
for Employers, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Mar. 9, 2010),
http://www.shrm.org/LegalIssues/FederalResources/Pages.FRDReport.aspx.
156. Hsieh, supra note 155.
157. CHERYL L. BEHYMER, FISHER & PHILLIPS LLP, EEOC PRIORITIES: FAMILY
RESPONSIBILITY DISCRIMINATION, SYSTEMIC CLAIMS, ETC. ARE YOU READY TO
LITIGATE WITH THE EEOC? (2010) (on file with author).
158. Jennifer Ludden, More Workers Alleging Bias Against Caregivers, NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(June
10,
2010),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=127531355.
159. STONE, supra note 23, at 120.
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gender divide in the male-dominated160 and historically antiwoman legal profession.161 However, that all changed as the
author and her female peers began having children—
specifically, second children. Some women reported sudden,
outright discrimination upon announcing their second
pregnancies.162 Others experienced more gradual, but no less
destructive, discrimination, such as being pushed to the
margins of the firm, being stripped of responsibilities they
held when they only had one child, and being subtly

160. See Barbara Flom, Report of the Seventh Annual National Association of
Women Lawyers National Survey on Retention and Promotion of Women in Law
Firms, NATI’L ASS’N OF WOMEN LAW. & NAWL FOUND. 3 (October, 2012),
http://nawl.timberlakepublishing.com/files/NAWL%202012%20Survey%20Repor
t%20final.pdf (“The typical AmLaw 200 firm is now a two tier partnership with
many different categories of lawyer in a leveraged structure: 151 equity
partners (barely 15% women), 91 non-equity partners (26% women), 54 counsel
(35% women), 188 associates (46% women), and 11 staff attorneys (70% women).
As the preceding numbers clearly show, women constitute a smaller percentage
of each category as you move up the career ladder.”). Likewise “[w]omen’s
median compensation lags men’s at all levels, with the worst discrepancy at the
equity partner level, where women typically earn only 89% of what men make.”
Id at 5.
161. See, e.g., In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 245 (1875) (denying Lavinia Goodell
admission to the state bar on the grounds that “[n]ature has tempered woman
as little for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as for the physical conflicts
of the battle field. Womanhood is moulded [sic] for gentler and better things.”);
see also Hannah C. Dugan, Does Gender Still Matter in the Legal Profession?
WISCONSIN
LAWYER
(Oct.
2002),
available
at
http://www.wisbar.org/newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?Vol
ume=75&Issue=10&ArticleID=248 (“In 1935 women lawyers in the U.S.
constituted 1 percent of all lawyers. It took 20 years to double to 2 percent;
another 20 years to increase another 50 percent to 3 percent of all lawyers; and
then another 20 years to increase another 300 percent to 16 percent of all
lawyers.”); Sandra Day O’Connor Biography, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD
BIOGRAPHY,
http://www.notablebiographies.com/Ni-Pe/O-Connor-SandraDay.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2013) (noting that although former United
States Supreme Court Justice O’Connor graduated from Stanford Law School in
1952, ranked third in her class and having been a member of the board of
editors of the Stanford Law Review, “after graduating, O’Connor tried to get a
job in Los Angeles and San Francisco law firms, but because of the prejudices
against women at that time . . . she could not get a job as a lawyer. She was
offered a position as a legal secretary. . . .”).
162. See the first vignette that opened the Article.
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excluded from the decision-making of the firm and then
terminated.163
A female attorney at a regional law firm reported that
she had observed the second child bias within her firm. She
saw anti-mother sentiments emerge when a colleague had
two children in a short span of time; the attorney stated
that “her group gave her a hard time for that”164 and that
there was an “impression [that] folks in her group were very
annoyed.”165 The attorneys in her practice group expressed
thoughts such as “There she goes on leave . . . again,”166 and
“I have to pick up the slack for her . . . again. She needs to
stop having kids.”167
Finally, at least one story of SCB has been documented
outside of the legal profession. In her book, The Price of
Motherhood: Why the Most Important Job in the World is
Still the Least Valued, Ann Crittenden tells the story of
Cindy DiBiasi. A Washington, D.C., television news channel
hired DiBiasi as an on-air medical reporter before she had
any children.168 Two days before she was to begin the job,
she discovered that she was pregnant. She worked until her
first baby was born and, after a ten-week maternity leave,
returned to her position on a full-time basis.169 Within a year
of returning to work after her first child, she became
pregnant again, at which time she requested to switch to a
three-day week with a prorated salary cut.170 The news
director told her he would “think about it.”171 She worked

163. See the second vignette that opened the Article.
164. See E-mail from a female attorney at the regional office of a national law
firm to the author (on file with author). The e-mail’s author requested
confidentiality.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. CRITTENDEN, supra note 3, at 100.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 101.
171. Id.
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until the delivery of her second child and began an eightweek maternity leave.172
Two days before she was scheduled to return to work,
the assistant news director called her and notified her that
she was being demoted: she would return to work as a
general assignment reporter, which was less predictable
and more demanding in terms of scheduling and time
commitment than her previous medical reporter position.173
Just a couple of months after her return to work, she was
asked to do a live shot—at the end of the day—from a
location about an hour from her home; completing this
assignment would mean that she would not get home until
9:00 p.m. and thus not see her children.174 When she
objected, her boss said, “Can’t your nanny just stay?” to
which she responded, “Number one, no, she can’t stay, and
number two, if she could stay, I don’t want to get home that
late. If I do that, I won’t see my kids at all.”175 Her boss’s
response was short and straightforward: “So, you’ll see
them tomorrow.”176
Realizing that her employer had not only demoted her,
but demoted her into a job it knew she could not do, she
retained counsel and considered bringing legal action
against the television station.177 However, the stress of
preparing for a lawsuit, working, and raising her children
was too much, and so she resigned instead.178 After fifteen
years in an industry she loved, DiBiasi lost her six-figure
income, her health insurance, and her economic
independence, all based on her attempt to work for fewer
days a week while her children were young.179

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 102.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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DiBiasi’s story demonstrates that the popular form of
family planning, namely having two children in a short
period of time, is not compatible with most women’s careers
because even though a new mother and her employer often
can cope with one child, the second child is “often the final
straw.”180 “The most sympathetic employers can prove
surprisingly resistant to the second baby.”181 The “system
can only accommodate so much deviation.”182
While not based on empirical research, these anecdotes
are nonetheless evidence that the SCB is real. While the
collection of empirical data pursuant to social science
protocols certainly would further bolster the claim of the
SCB, the lack of such empirical evidence does not erase the
phenomenon of the SCB.
2. Case Law.
The Center for WorkLife Law’s Litigation Update 2010
includes a section titled “Second Child Bias.”183 It notes that
in a “significant subset of cases (N=89), mothers report
experiencing little discrimination until they become
pregnant with their second child or with a multiple birth. . .
. The assumption behind these [adverse employment]
actions appears to be that a mother can handle one child
and work, but two are too much.”184 While no case law has
yet labeled a FRD claim as a SCB claim, several cases
indicate that such claims are viable. The facts of these cases
reveal discrimination that emerged when an employer knew
that a mother had, or planned to have, more than one child.
In Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp.,185
a high-level executive sued her employer alleging that she
was terminated because her employer learned that she
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 103.
183. LITIGATION UPDATE 2010, supra note 47, at 19.
184. Id.
185. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46 (1st Cir.
2000).
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planned to have a second child.186 The plaintiff prevailed
based on evidence that managers had repeatedly asked her
how her husband was managing since she was not home to
cook for him, and whether she could perform her job
effectively after having a second child.187 Additionally, a
company director allegedly stated that his secretary had
stopped working late after having children, and “that is
what happens when we hire females in the child-bearing
years.”188 The trial court granted summary judgment to the
employer on plaintiff’s sex discrimination and retaliation
claims under Title VII; but the appellate court reversed on
the Title VI sex discrimination claim, finding the comments
to be evidence of discrimination.189
The facts of Trezza v. Hartford, Inc.,190 showed
employment discrimination against an attorney who was a
mother of two young children. She claimed that her
employer failed to consider her for a promotion because she
was a mother.191 She had received consistently excellent job
evaluations, but the higher position was offered to less
qualified men with children, who turned it down, and then
to a woman without children.192 The employer told the
plaintiff that she was not considered for the promotion
because it would require extensive traveling, in which she
presumably would not be interested because of her family.193
In addition, the senior vice-president of her company
complained to her about the “incompetence and laziness of

186. See id. at 50-52, 57.
187. Id. at 50. Other evidence in the plaintiff’s favor included a company
employment profile that excluded married women and women with children; a
vice-president allegedly told her the profile was “nothing personal against you,
but that he preferred unmarried, childless women because they would give
150% to the job.” Id. at 51.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 57-59.
190. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 WL 912101 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 1998).
191. Id. at *1-3.
192. Id. at *2.
193. Id. at *1.
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women who are also working mothers.”194 He also
commented that “women are not good planners, especially
women with kids.”195 The general counsel of the legal
department in which she worked stated that working
mothers cannot be both good mothers and good workers,
saying, “I don’t see how you can do either job well.”196 The
court denied the employer’s motion to dismiss based on this
evidence.197
In Stern v. Cintas Corp., the plaintiff began working for
the defendant as a salesperson to certain national accounts;
when she was hired, she had no children.198 Mr. Riesner
became the plaintiff’s supervisor and, soon after, the
plaintiff took maternity leave for her first child.199 She
returned as a full-time employee, “working three days per
week in the office and two days per week from home or on
the road.”200 After the plaintiff told Riesner that she was
pregnant with her second child, she learned that Riesner
had begun refusing to accept applications for sales positions
from women.201 Shortly after plaintiff learned of this refusal,
she recommended that he interview a female applicant, to
which he responded: “[Y]ou know Cintas doesn’t hire women
for sales positions.” He then went on to state: “There are no
females in the sales force in Cincinnati. . . . [because] they
don’t view women as being long-term employees. . . .[and]
because they tend to get married and have babies.”202
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id.
196. Id. In addition to these expressly biased comments, the court also
considered that only seven of the 46 managing attorneys were females and that
none of them were mothers with school age children, whereas many of the male
managing attorneys were fathers. Id. at *3.
197. Id. at *7.
198. See Stern v. Cintas Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 841, 843-44 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
199. Id. at 844.
200. Id.
201. See id. at 845-46.
202. Id. at 846.

948

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Plaintiff also alleged that, after she announced her
second pregnancy, she observed discrimination against
other saleswomen, such as being rated lower than poorperforming male salespeople in a ranking system.203
Plaintiff alleged that, after complaining about Riesner’s
comments, she was denied her job title, her raise, and her
bonus plan.204 When plaintiff again expressed her views
about sex discrimination, a supervisor stated that her views
did not “really matter” as she was “not even going to be
here” due to her impending second maternity leave.205
Plaintiff further testified that, beginning with her return
from her first maternity leave, Riesner “often alluded to the
fact that one of the reasons that he was not putting me back
into sales . . . was because I probably didn’t want to travel
based on my pregnancy, and made inferences . . . about my
preferences regarding my career and the fact that I would
rather go managing people than traveling and being in
sales.”206
Approximately six weeks before she was scheduled to
have her second child and take her second maternity leave,
Riesner told plaintiff that he had been reassigned to
another division and would no longer need her assistance
with management duties.207 On that date, plaintiff filed a
Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and the Illinois
Department of Human Rights, alleging that she had

203. See id. at 848.
204. Id. at 849.
205. Id. at 849. Soon after, Riesner (1) directed the plaintiff to answer
telephones during some weekday departmental meetings and (2) excluded her
from weekend meetings while plaintiff’s supervisees attended these meetings.
He explained these decisions by telling the plaintiff that her “presence wasn’t
required, that [she would] probably be more comfortable answering the phones,
and that [she] should stay home and rest on Saturdays rather than coming to an
all-day meeting.” Id.
206. Id. at 853-54.
207. Id. at 851.
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experienced sex and pregnancy discrimination.208 Plaintiff
was then terminated and filed suit.209
The defendant moved for summary judgment.210 The
federal district court denied in part the motion, holding that
plaintiff offered facts to support the required “adverse
employment action” under a Title VII claims.211 The court
then held that plaintiff had presented sufficient direct
evidence of discriminatory animus to survive summary
judgment by claiming that Riesner and his supervisor did
not believe that mothers and mothers-to-be should be in
sales; under Title VII, “an employer may not treat mothers
and mothers-to-be differently from fathers and fathers-tobe.”212 The court also held that plaintiff’s circumstantial
evidence was sufficient to survive summary judgment.213
Other cases reveal facts that illustrate the SCB at work.
For example, in Eslinger v. U.S. Central Credit Union,214 the
plaintiff began working for the defendant as a corporate
representative and, over the course of ten years, advanced
to the position of Assistant Vice President of Settlement
Services.215 Soon after a new president was hired, he had a
conversation with the plaintiff during which he commented
on another employee who was on maternity leave, stating
“you can’t trust pregnant women, especially those with their
second child because you never know if they are going to
come back or not.”216 The president told another employee,

208. Id. Approximately a month later, the plaintiff filed an amended Charge of
Discrimination with the EEOC, alleging that she had been subjected to
retaliation for a letter sent to defendant from her attorney. Id. at 852.
209. Id. at 852.
210. Id. at 842.
211. See id. at 857, 861.
212. Id. at 858, 861 n.38.
213. Id. at 865.
214. Eslinger v. U.S. Cent. Credit Union 866 F. Supp. 491 (D. Kan. 1994).
215. Id. at 493.
216. Id. at 494. At the time of this conversation, the plaintiff was pregnant
with her second child, but did not yet know it. Id.
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upon her return from maternity leave, that, in his opinion
“women were better workers ‘until they have kids.’”217
After the plaintiff returned from maternity leave for her
second child, the president gave her a lecture on
motherhood, stating that she “could always come back in
the work force later on.”218 At this time, the president
considered eliminating the plaintiff’s position.219 Just a few
months later, he did eliminate the plaintiff’s position and
terminated her; she was not offered another position or a
lower position.220 The company contended that the
termination was solely to improve corporate efficiency.221
The plaintiff disagreed and filed a Title VII sex
discrimination claim, in response to which the defendant
filed a motion for summary judgment.222 The court denied
the motion for summary judgment.223 Importantly in the
FRD context generally, in reaching this decision, the court
held that remarks based on sex stereotypes can be evidence
that gender played a role in the termination decision.224
Important to the SCB context in particular, the court noted
that a supervisor’s comment expressing “doubts regarding
the likelihood that women who give birth to a second child
return to work” was evidence of sex discrimination.225
Another case with facts illustrating SCB is Hackett v.
Clifton Gunderson, L.L.C.226 In Hackett, the defendant hired
plaintiff as a technology consultant, and she became
pregnant with her second child a few months after starting
that job.227 Upon learning about plaintiff’s second
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id.at 494-95.
223. See id. at 495.
224. See id. at 495-96.
225. Id. at 497-98.
226. Hackett v. Clifton Gunderson, L.L.C., No. 03 C 6046, 2004 WL 2445373,
(N.D. Ill. Nov. 1, 2004).
227. Id. at *1.
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pregnancy, her supervisor periodically questioned her about
whether she would return to work after the birth of her
second child, and responded with skepticism when plaintiff
responded that she would return to work.228 In addition, the
supervisor expressed concern about plaintiff’s “ability to
handle two children and a job”229 because “it would be a lot
more difficult with a second child.”230 The defendant
terminated the plaintiff while she was on maternity leave
for her second child, and in response, plaintiff filed suit.231
The defendant moved for summary judgment, which the
court denied. The court held that the plaintiff’s evidence—
the statements by her supervisor that “appear to question
her ability to handle her job after giving birth” to her second
child—rebutted defendant’s assertion that plaintiff’s
termination was based on legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons.232
Finally, in Vosdingh v. Qwest Dex, Inc.,233 the court held
that plaintiff had met her McDonnell Douglas burden (and
thus denied summary judgment to defendants) in a PDA
case.234 Specifically, the court held that the plaintiff met her
burden in rebutting the defendant’s evidence of a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her demotion by
presenting evidence that, after telling a supervisor that she
was pregnant with her second child, the supervisor
commented: “[W]hat are you going to do about your job?”235
and “It’s hard to come back after a second child,” and “It’s
hard to do this job with two kids . . . .”236

228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at *3 n. 2.
231. See id. at *1-2.
232. Id. at *4.
233. Vosdingh v. Qwest Dex, Inc., No. Civ. 03-4284 ADM/AJB 2005 WL
1323007 (D. Minn. June 2, 2005).
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id. at *3.
236. Id.
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While these cases, along with others,237 resulted in
positive precedent or outcomes for plaintiffs asserting an
FRD claim based on the SCB, other courts have held
against such plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage.238
3. Social Science Research.
In addition to case law and anecdotal evidence, social
science has produced some empirical evidence to support
the existence of the SCB within the realm of the “wage
penalty for motherhood,” the phenomenon that motherhood
negatively affects a women’s wages.239 The motherhood
penalty is the wage gap between mothers and non-mothers;
for individuals under age 35, this pay gap is bigger than the
pay gap between men and women.240 This penalty is
grounded in society’s understanding of the “ideal mother”
237. See, e.g., Complaint, EEOC v. Denver Hotel Mgmt Co., Inc., No. 1:10-cv01712-REB-BNB (D. Colo. July 20, 2010). Plaintiff and the EEOC charged that
defendant Denver Hotel Management Company (DHMC) violated Title VII by
its refusal to promote plaintiff to a newly created position of assistant human
resource director because of her caregiver responsibilities as the mother of two
young children, and the job was given to a less qualified and less experienced
employee; DHMC explained to plaintiff that she was being passed over for the
job because of her role as a mother of young children, asserting that she could
not relocate or work the required 50-60 hour work week because she “had a fulltime job at home with her children,” but never asked if she would be willing to
relocate or work extended hours. Id. at 2-4. In a consent decree, DHMC agreed
to pay $105,000 to plaintiff and also agreed to revamp its discrimination policies
and conduct training for all of its employees to explain how stereotypes
concerning a person’s family responsibilities can constitute illegal sex
discrimination. See Consent Decree at 2-6, EEOC v. Denver Hotel Mgmt. Co.,
No. 1:10-cv-01712-REB-BNB (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2010).
238. See, e.g., Norrell v. Waste Away Group, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 122326 (M.D. Ala. 2003) (holding that plaintiff met the prima facie prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test, but failed to meet her additional burden of proving
pretext to defendant’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for her demotion;
finding insufficient plaintiff’s evidence that a supervisor told her that he “was
surprised that she sought the district sales manager position . . . because the
position involved a good deal of travel and Plaintiff would have two young
children” and instead holding that such comment was a “stray remark” that did
not demonstrate pretext).
239. See Budig & England, supra note 20, at 217.
240. See Shelly J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 1297 (2007).
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which conflicts with “ideal worker” role; this tension causes
evaluators to expect mothers to be less competent and less
committed to their work.241 The “ideal mother” role is, in
turn, grounded in a normative expectation that mothers
should (and do) engage in “intensive mothering”—a notion
that mothers must place the needs of children above all
other activities, including work.242 However, the “ideal
mother” role is based on expectations and assumptions
rather than on the actual feelings and desires of women
with children.243
These assumptions and perceptions play out in terms of
real penalties for working mothers. In one study,
“competence ratings” were approximately 10 percent lower
for mothers than for non-mothers, and “commitment
ratings” were approximately 15 percent lower.244 In addition,
student participants held mothers to stricter standards for
performance and punctuality.245 With regard to pay, the
recommended starting salary for mothers was $11,000 less
than that offered to non-mothers, a 7.4 percent difference.246
Participants also rated mothers as significantly less
promotable and were less likely to recommend mothers for
Finally,
participants
management
positions.247
recommended non-mothers for hire 84 percent of the time
but only recommended mothers for hire 47 percent of the

241. Id. at 1298.
242. Id. at 1306.
243. Id. at 1306-07 (“[T]he tension between these two roles occurs at the level
of normative cultural assumptions, and not necessarily at the level of mothers’
own commitment to work roles. In fact, if work commitment is measured by the
importance people attach to their work identities—either absolutely or relative
to other identities, such as family identities—no difference is found in
commitment between mothers and non-mothers. It is the perceived cultural
tension between these two roles that leads us to suggest that motherhood is a
devalued status in the workplace.”) (internal citations omitted).
244. Id. at 1316.
245. Id. (“Mothers were allowed significantly fewer times of being late to work,
and they needed a significantly higher score on the management exam than
nonmothers before being considered hirable.”).
246. Id.
247. Id.
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time.248 These negative consequences and outright penalties
did not attach to men who were parents.249
This discrimination against mothers is known as
normative discrimination, which
occurs when employers discriminate against mothers because
employers believe, perhaps unconsciously, that success in the paid
labor market (particularly in jobs traditionally considered
masculine) signals stereotypically masculine qualities such as
assertiveness or dominance. These qualities are inconsistent with
those culturally expected of mothers, such as being warm and
nurturing. We expect that when employed mothers violate these
normative expectations by showing a high level of competence and
commitment to paid work, they will be disliked and viewed as less
warm and more interpersonally hostile (e.g., more selfish, cold and
devious) than other types of workers. As a result, employers may
be more likely to deny salary and other rewards to successful
250
mothers than to other successful employees.

Moreover, the “lack of fit” model, described above,
theorizes that mothers are seen as “exemplars, or
prototypes, of the female category.”251 As a result, people
attribute to women strong feminine characteristics, which
in turn lead people to perceive mothers as a particularly
poor fit for “male” jobs.252 The “lack of fit” model thus
conflates motherhood and gender.253
248. Id.
249. Id. at 1318. In fact, there appears to be a “fatherhood bonus”—childless
men were offered a starting salary of $148,000, while fathers were offered a
starting salary of $152,000. Id. at 1321. Parenthood had the opposite effect on
women: nonmothers were offered a starting salary of $151,000 while mothers
were offered a starting salary of $139,000. Id. at 1323.
250. Normative Discrimination, supra note 29, at 617. This kind of
discrimination differs from the kind of discrimination that results from the
devaluing of the motherhood status in the workplace, which leads to the
stereotype that mothers are less competent or less committed to their jobs.
Rather, normative discrimination occurs after a mother has proven her
competence in and commitment to the workplace—these mothers who violate
prescriptive stereotypes about the appropriate place for women are
discriminated against. See Benard et al., supra note 12, at 1385.
251. Benard et al., supra note 12, at 1367.
252. See id.
253. See id.

2013]

SECOND CHILD BIAS

955

These perceptions—not the reality of working mothers’
performances at work—fuel stereotypes, lead to biases
(either express or implicit), and result in discrimination in
the form of FRD generally and to the manifestation of the
SCB in particular. With regard to the SCB more
specifically, the research reveals a gross wage penalty of 2
percent for one child, of 13 percent for two children, and of
22 percent for three or more children.254 The authors note
that the penalty for the first child is small, but that the
second child has a much larger incremental effect.255
Moreover, the social science research on stereotypes
also suggests the potential for SCB. The two normative
models that underlie prescriptive stereotyping are the
“family devotion schema,” which dictates domesticity for
women, and the “work devotion schema,” which dictates
paid labor for men.256 While the post-Title VII era of the past
40-plus years seem to have educated, penalized, and
sensitized employers in a way that has made them
increasingly able to manage the tension between these
schema when a woman is the mother to a single child, the
SCB occurs when this fragile balance is disrupted by the
arrival of the second child. The second child tips the
already-tenuous balance between the “family devotion
schema” and the “work devotion schema” in such a way as
to permit employers to express their previously-suppressed
stereotypes and prejudices about mothers and paid work,
and that expression is manifested in the normative
discrimination known as the SCB.
The anecdotal evidence, case law, and social science
research on norms, stereotypes, biases and discrimination
strongly suggest that there is a difference between the
stereotyping of and discrimination against a mother of one
child and a mother of two or more children. As a result, the
article argues for the recognition and naming of this
difference. The actors in the legal system—lawyers, clients,
254. Budig & England, supra note 20, at 217.
255. Id.
256. See Normative Discrimination, supra note 29, at 621 (quoting MARY
BLAIR-LOY, COMPETING DEVOTIONS: CAREER AND FAMILY AMONG WOMEN
EXECUTIVES (2003)).
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judges, legislators, and agencies—should specifically
recognize a “second child stereotype” that is distinct from
the more general stereotypes currently articulated under
the umbrella of the “family devotion schema” and the “work
devotion schema.” As discussed below, naming this new
stereotype is important for both legal and normative
reasons.
II. WHAT CAUSES THE SECOND CHILD BIAS? IMPLICIT BIAS
AND THE JUSTIFICATION-SUPPRESSION MODEL OF THE
EXPRESSION AND EXPERIENCE OF PREJUDICE
The anecdotal evidence of the SCB, as well as the
disproportionate reduction in pay after having a second
child, begs the question: why does discrimination against
working mothers increase after they have a second child?
The answer likely lies in two psychological models: (1)
implicit bias, and (2) the Justification-Suppression Model of
the Expression and Experience of Prejudice. While implicit
bias has been widely discussed in legal scholarship
concerning FRD, the Justification-Suppression Model
previously has not been applied specifically to FRD or the
SCB in particular. This part summarizes both phenomena
in order to explain the origins of the SCB.
A. Biases and Stereotypes
As described above, social scientists have identified
several kinds of stereotypes concerning female workers
generally and working mothers in particular. These
stereotypes can lead to biases against working mothers,
either express biases or implicit biases. Conscious (express
or explicit) bias is objectively identifiable because it is the
conscious basis for an individual’s motivation to
discriminate. In the FRD context, an example of a conscious
stereotype that turns into a bias would be a supervisor’s
express statement that the company did not have any
women in its ranks because that division did not consider
women to be long-term employees because women “tend to
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get married and have babies.”257 Such evidence would, and
in fact did, support an FRD claim.258
Implicit bias, however, presents challenges of proof for
the FRD plaintiff. An implicit bias is one that is
fundamentally automatic and that manifests so quickly that
people often are surprised to learn that they have, and
show, the bias.259 Because implicit bias is unconscious,
discrimination against working mothers (and other
protected classes) that is based on implicit bias often lacks
the explicit, “smoking gun” evidence to sustain an FRD
claim.260
Biases against mothers, which are based on the
stereotypes discussed in Part I, can lead to “role incongruity
discrimination.” Role incongruity emerges from a
widespread social and cultural ambivalence about the full
inclusion of women into the work world. For example, one
study found that almost half of Americans believe that preschool children suffer when their mothers work.”261 Another
study revealed that more than 40 percent of working
parents fear that many working mothers care more about
success in the workplace than meeting the needs of their
children.262 This societal expectation of “intensive
mothering” exists notwithstanding increasing economic
pressure on many American families that forces both
parents to have paying jobs.263

257. See, e.g., Stern v. Cintas Corp., 319 F. Supp. 2d 841, 846 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
258. See id. at 861.
259. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 969, 975 (2006).
260. See id. at 976 (“[A]ntidiscrimination law has long forbidden various forms
of differential treatment on the basis of race and other protected traits. . . .
Some of the hardest cases present problems of proof: if there is no ‘smoking gun,’
how can bias be established? . . . [I]t seems clear that when [implicit bias] is
producing differential treatment, the legal system will often encounter
unusually serious difficulties.”).
261. See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 21, at 54.
262. See id.
263. See id. (“Whether or not they hold paid jobs, mothers face conflicting
social expectations that are difficult to meet.”).
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The SCB indicates that this tension between the
culturally-ideal mother and the culturally-ideal worker
comes to a head when a working mother has a second child.
When SCB discrimination occurs, it is the second child that
seems to have become the “tipping point”—the point at
which the “mother” role overshadows the “worker” role to
such an extent that the employer no longer believes that the
woman can perform the “worker” role at all. But what
causes the second child to act as this tipping point? The
answer likely lies in the Justification-Suppression Model of
prejudice and discrimination.
B. The Justification-Suppression Model
The Justification-Suppression Model (“JSM”) is based
on the basic premise that the “expression of prejudice is
marked by a deep conflict between a desire to express an
emotion and, at the same time, to maintain values and selfconcepts that conflict with prejudice.”264 It asserts that
prejudice is not outwardly expressed unless a justification
exists to support the release of the otherwise-suppressed
prejudice.265
The JSM study defines prejudice as “a negative
evaluation of a social group or a negative evaluation of an
individual that is significantly based on the individual’s
group membership.”266 That definition is consistent with
what occurs when the SCB becomes manifest: a negative
evaluation of a mother of more than one child based on her
group membership in the social group defined as working
women who have passed the tipping point between an “ideal
worker plus one child” and a “presumptively unproductive,
uncommitted worker plus two children.”
The JSM describes the process by which an underlying
and suppressed prejudice becomes experienced and
outwardly expressed.267 This model thus fits well with what
264. Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 26, at 414.
265. See generally id. at 416-17.
266. Id. at 414.
267. Id. at 416-17.
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the article proposes occurs in the SCB: the latent prejudice
against working mothers of one child, which most employers
know on some level is culturally or legally improper (or
both), finds expression once that working mother has a
second child. It is that event—the arrival of the second
child—that allows employers to express the previouslysuppressed prejudice (and resulting discrimination) against
mothers based on the employers’ stereotypes that a working
mother cannot attain the norm of the “ideal worker.”
The JSM places the different components of prejudice
into three categories: genuine prejudice; suppressors; or
justifiers.268 Genuine prejudice is an unequivocal negative
feeling toward members of an undervalued group.269
Genuine prejudice is learned, in part, from family, the
media, religion, and peers,270 as well as from direct contact
with the undervalued group.271 Genuine prejudice is
connected with implicit bias.272
While everyone holds some genuine prejudices, the JSM
explains that prejudice is often suppressed and thus not
outwardly expressed.273 Suppression of prejudice occurs both
internally within a person’s conscience and externally to the
outside world.274 The suppression is a result of social and
cultural
pressures
to
maintain
a
nonprejudiced
appearance.275 Suppressing prejudice, however, requires
268. See id. at 417-18.
269. Id. at 418.
270. See id. at 418-19.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 419 (“Like genuine prejudice, implicit attitudes are not directly
accessible through self-report, and they play a subtle and underappreciated role
in directing behavior. Genuine prejudice and implicit attitudes are both
conceptualized to account for the discrepancy between expressed attitudes (often
favorable) and intergroup activity (often discriminatory).”).
273. See id. at 418.
274. See id.
275. See id. at 418-22. These pressures include (1) “playing for an audience,”
which is the notion that “[p]ublic, accountable behavior shows less evidence of
prejudice than private, anonymous behavior” and that “[p]eople change reports
of prejudice depending on the audience”; (2) empathy, which “makes people
rethink the appropriateness of the prejudice, adding an explicit value of
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mental energy that can lead to mental fatigue, which in
turn can lead to suppression failures, a reduced ability to
self-regulate, and inadvertent expressions of prejudice.276
Thus, a paradox of suppression is that it can have the effect
of enhancing prejudice: suppression requires a person to
inhibit expression of a genuinely-held belief—the
prejudice—that otherwise would be expressed.277 The
suppression creates a build-up of tension between the
societal requirement to appear unprejudiced and the
personal desire to express the prejudice.278 This tension
forces the person to find ways to express the suppressed
prejudice, so that the tension can be relieved; it is
“justification” that allows the expression of a suppressed
prejudice and thus the release of the tension caused by the
suppression.279
Justification is defined as a “psychological or social
process that can serve as an opportunity to express genuine
prejudice without suffering external or internal sanction.”280
According to the JSM, justification of prejudice acts as a
releaser of prejudice by providing a socially acceptable
reason to let go of the suppression and express the
prejudice.281 The justification must allow for the expression
of prejudice while simultaneously upholding the appearance
of fairness, equality and egalitarianism.282 As a result, a
justification at once permits the expression of prejudice
while covering the “roots of discrimination.”283
tolerance leading to a more favorable outward attitude (but without changing
the genuine prejudice”; (3) “self as audience” which is the notion that “[n]ot only
do some people wish to appear nonprejudiced to others but they also wish to
appear nonprejudiced to themselves”; (4) religion; (5) politics; (6) concepts of
egalitarianism; and (7) personal standards. See id. at 421-22 (internal citations
omitted).
276. Id. at 423.
277. Id. at 417, 420 n.2.
278. Id. at 425.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
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The JSM contends that many of the factors that
correlate with or cause prejudice, such as personal
attitudes, beliefs and religion, also justify that prejudice in a
way that leads an individual to no longer suppress the
prejudice but to instead outwardly express it.284 While some
models of prejudice argue that individuals would take steps
to suppress prejudice if they could just figure out that they
were prejudiced, the JSM suggests instead that individuals
are motivated to find one or more justifications to permit
them to outwardly express their prejudices without negative
consequences, guilt, or shame.285
Justifications release prejudices in two ways: first, they
permit the public expression of prejudice.286 Second, they
permit an individual to “integrate a negative attitude
toward a group into oneself without labeling oneself
prejudiced. These two functions represent public avowal
and private acceptance.”287
An example from the JSM literature illustrates the
theory. Many “people tend to believe that the world is just
and fair, where people ‘get what they deserve.’” People who
ascribe to this “naturalistic fallacy” report higher levels of
prejudice: “If one believes that people get what they deserve
and deserve what they get, prejudice toward poor,
unemployed, imprisoned, underpaid—any person or group
doing poorly—is justified, because such people deserve their
unhappy fates.”288 The result of the justification (“the world
is fair and people get what they deserve”) is to release the
prejudice (the justification of deservingness allows the
expression of prejudice against out-groups).289 This
“naturalistic fallacy” conceptualization is one of several
categories of justification that in turn lead to the expression
284. See id. at 416.
285. Id. In fact, “adequately justified prejudices are not even labeled as
prejudices.” Examples of adequately justified prejudices not even labeled as
prejudices are prejudice toward rapists, child abusers, and enemy soldiers. Id.
286. Id. at 432.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 426.
289. Id.
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of prejudice.290 Importantly in the context of asserting a SCB
claim, “the individual’s justifications and suppressions may
lead to a genuinely believed self-image of nonprejudice, even
while the participant is behaving in a discriminatory
way.”291
C. The Justification-Suppression Model Applied to the
Second Child Bias
As described above, the JSM is a dynamic model that
describes how prejudice comes to be expressed: “Underlying
prejudice becomes stymied by a variety of suppression
processes but can be released into expressions by a variety
of justification processes.”292 The JSM likely is the cognitive
mechanism underlying the SCB.
There is little dispute that a prejudice against working
mothers exists. This prejudice is informed by the various
stereotypes about working mothers discussed throughout
the Article. Further, there is little dispute that this
prejudice sometimes is expressed as sex-based employment
discrimination. However, the anti-working-mother prejudice
is also clearly suppressed much of the time, particularly in
the post-Title VII era. Title VII’s passage, the women’s
movement, and the influx of a vast number of mothers into
the workforce over the past 40 years has created—at least
at a surface level—a cultural norm that mothers “should”
have equal employment opportunities; this norm creates an
increasingly negative social view of outright prejudice
toward working mothers. Suppression of the prejudice is the
result.
However, the resulting suppression of prejudice against
mothers is generally low. This low-level suppression results
from a general belief that women choose to be mothers. We
need not suppress prejudice if the status of motherhood was
brought on by the woman herself. The competing social
290. The others are: (1) preservation of the status quo; (2) celebration of social
hierarchy; (3) attributions and personal responsibility; (4) covering; (5) values,
religion and stereotypes; and (6) intergroup processes. Id. at 426-31.
291. Id. at 432.
292. Id. at 437.
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norm that women should be able to have children and a
career may increase the level of suppression when a woman
has one child. However, once that woman has one child,
people think she has fulfilled her “right” to have children
and a career, so the second child seems excessive.293
Moreover, the second child stereotype kicks in and creates
the normative script within the employer that the mother
“should” stay home now that she has two children, because
the expectation of “intensive mothering” can no longer be
satisfied if she spends any time in paid work, or because of
the stereotype that she can no longer bring any commitment
to her job. Thus, employers no longer suppress their antiworking-mother prejudice upon the announcement or
arrival of the second child and express it through an
adverse employment action.
Put another way, the JSM is consistent with the notion
of treating a working mother with one child with
suppressed prejudice and suppressed discrimination.
However, “tolerating” the first child can become a
justification to “punish” the working mother—via
discrimination that results from the emergence of the
prejudice—on the basis of the second child.294
III. RECOGNIZING AND NAMING THE SECOND CHILD BIAS WILL
ENGENDER LEGAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Recognizing and expressly naming the SCB—in formal
EEOC complaints, in complaints filed in courts, to
investigators, in legal scholarship, and in the mass media—
is important for several reasons, both legal and normative.
A. The Legal Importance of Naming the SCB
Identifying for litigants, lawyers, and courts the
dynamics of the second child stereotype, SCB, and resulting
discrimination will assist litigants and their attorneys in
293. See E-mail from Shelley Correll, Sociology Professor, Stanford University,
to the author (Oct. 4, 2012, 2:21 PM) (on file with author).
294. See E-mail from Chris Crandall, Social Psychology Professor, University
of Kansas, to the author (Oct. 5, 2012, 2:29 PM) (on file with author).
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articulating viable claims under Title VII’s provisions and
the precedent construing that statute. More specifically,
naming the SCB as its own model of discrimination will add
to the body of Title VII law that protects mothers against
discrimination based on sex-stereotypes and biases
associated with mothers and paid work. Adding the SCB
model to the existing stable of FRD models and theories will
make FRD jurisprudence more robust and thus more
reflective (and protective) of the actual experiences of
women with two children.
More specifically, recognizing the second child
stereotype and naming the resulting SCB will continue a
nascent trend in Title VII jurisprudence—permitting sex
discrimination plaintiffs to use “stereotype” evidence rather
than “comparator” evidence, which is particularly important
to prove discrimination in FRD cases.295 Giving plaintiffs’
attorneys and courts a new and specific stereotype (and
resulting bias) will give both additional ammunition to
argue and hold that comparator evidence simply is not
required for a plaintiff to carry her burden in an FRD case
involving SCB. Advancing Title VII jurisprudence in this
way is important given that the comparator requirement
has a “devastating effect on plaintiff’s ability to win sexbased Title VII claims, as adequate comparators are very
rarely available in the contemporary workplace.”296
Naming the SCB, and thus adding this theory of
discrimination to the wider FRD conversation, both inside
and outside of lawsuits and courts, is also important for
policy reasons. Naming the SCB will educate employers and
their counsel about discrimination that may be happening
in their workplaces, but that likely is implicit and thus
invisible. Naming the SCB will assist company-side
attorneys to better counsel employers about the nuances of
discrimination against mothers not only to protect their
clients from liability, but also to encourage them to
supplement their training of employees about the SCB and

295. See supra Part I.A.2.
296. Franklin, supra note 9, at 1311.
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therefore prevent such bias and discrimination in the
future.297
B. The Normative Importance of Naming the Second Child
Bias
A normative reason to expressly name the SCB lies in
the critically important role of courts in fulfilling the law’s
expressive function. Susan Sturm advocates for a “dynamic
and reciprocal relationship between judicially elaborated
general legal norms and workplace-generated problemsolving approaches.”298 She states:
In elaborating the general nondiscrimination principles enacted in
Title VII, courts continue to fulfill the law’s expressive function by
articulating general norms and underscoring their continued
importance. In addition, they create the focal points for non-legal
actors to give these general norms meaning in new contexts, and
to share the results of these context-specific elaborations. . . .
[Courts can] act as a catalyst, encouraging or even providing the
structure for deliberations aimed at solving problems that
threaten the legality (and efficacy) of institutions. Courts also
supply incentives for employers to implement effective internal
problem-solving
mechanisms
and
to
evaluate
their
299
effectiveness.

297. See Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 117-18; Susan Sturm,
Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 564 (2001) [hereinafter Second Generation Employment
Discrimination]. The EEOC has recognized that naming a discrete type of
discrimination is an important part of the educational component with which
the EEOC is tasked:
And our job, as an agency, is to make sure that we are enforcing the
laws. And that starts with education. That starts with letting people
know what the law says . . . . It means putting out clear guidance, in
writing, about what the law says. It means educating our investigators,
so they know when charges come in that the law has been violated. And
finally, if need be, it means going to court.
Testimony of Commissioner Chai Feldblum, to meeting of EEOC
Commissioners, Unlawful Discrimination Against Pregnant Workers and
Workers
with
Caregiving
Responsibilities
(Feb.
15,
2012),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/2-15-12/transcript.cfm.
298. Second Generation Employment Discrimination, supra note 297, at 522.
299. Id. at 556-57.
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Sturm’s holistic approach to remedying discrimination
asserts that the most effective remedies combine
“elaborating general norms, building problem-solving
capacity, and developing systems of accountability.”300
Expressly naming the SCB will further Sturm’s vision
for remedying discrimination. When a court uses the term
“second child bias” and discusses that bias, its underlying
stereotype, and the resulting discrimination, it gives
normative and expressive legitimacy to the experience of
those mothers who have experienced the SCB. In so doing,
courts will thus enlarge the scope of the wider discussion—
in the mass media, within the human resources community,
within companies themselves, etc.—about FRD. Thus, the
work of redefining norms—to begin to reflect the reality of
the experiences of working mothers with two children—will
be advanced in ways that include “elaborating general
norms, building problem-solving capacity, and developing
systems of accountability.”301
Another normative reason to expressly name the SCB is
that it empowers individuals and engenders larger social
change. On the individual level, naming the SCB fits within
the well-established framework of “rights talk.” Because law
reform takes place incrementally, “rights talk” plays an
important legal and social role: It leads to higher success
rates in litigation and it also “sets in motion” a larger social
dynamic.302 Thus, in times of societal change, “rights talk”
causes cultural change by influencing our understanding of
who owes what to whom, which in turn shapes our
perception of what is legal and what is ethical.303 The
transformative power of “rights talk” is its ability to render
normative claims factual ones: “‘It is my right’ means not
only that things should go my way, but that I have an
entitlement to ensure they do so because of my pre-existing
‘right.’”304 Naming discriminations and the rights that
300. Id. at 479.
301. Id.
302. See Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 113.
303. Id.
304. Id.
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attach to fighting those discriminations both reflects our
current identity and begins to define our future identity.305
Labeling SCB as a unique manifestation of FRD can
empower these mothers by “[setting] up powerful social
dynamics outside the courtroom” through consciousnessraising.306 Moreover, situating the SCB within the “rights
talk” framework will assist in reconceptualizing what we
mean by “work-family conflict” into a structural problem
rather than a personal one. As a result, mothers will begin
to look outward for the cause of the conflict and insist on
social change, rather than looking inward and blaming
themselves.307 This process of “naming, blaming and
claiming” will only begin by naming SCB, blaming its
underlying stereotypes, and claiming the resulting
discrimination as sex-based discrimination.308
Additionally, naming the second child stereotype and
the SCB as its own phenomenon within FRD is normatively
important because “naming the processes of prejudice,
discrimination, and oppression . . . helps to question
society’s values, categories, and rules”309 about working
mothers with two children. “Even in the simple act of

305. Id.
306. Id. at 114.
307. Id.
308. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming. . ., 15
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 633 (1980-81) (“In order for disputes to emerge an
remedial action to be taken, an unperceived injurious experience . . . must be
transformed into a perceived injurious experience.”); see also id. at 635-37
(“[S]aying to oneself that a particular experience has been injurious —we call
naming. . . . The next step is the transformation of a perceived injurious
experience into a grievance. This occurs when a person attributes an injury to
the fault of another individual or societal entity. . . . [T]he transformation from
perceived injurious experience to grievance blaming. . . . The third
transformation occurs when someone with a grievance voices it to the person or
entity believed to be responsible and asks for some remedy. We call this
communication claiming.”).
309. Shannon B. Dermer, Shannon D. Smith and Korenna K. Barto,
Identifying and Correctly Labeling Sexual Prejudice, Discrimination, and
Oppression, 8 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 325, 327 (2010).
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naming society’s prejudice and hostility,” we “help ‘identify
it as a problem for individuals and society.’”310
Finally, naming the SCB matters—normatively,
socially, and politically—because the “act of naming also
gives activists, advocates, and allies the ability to
externalize and battle against [negative] . . . attitudes that
may, at first, seem nebulous but result in real, systematic
oppression.”311
CONCLUSION
The area of employment discrimination law known as
FRD has grown from a handful of cases into a groundswell
of litigation and scholarship over the past decade. An
emerging trend in FRD is the SCB. There is strong
anecdotal evidence of the SCB, but no body of empirical
data pursuant to social science protocols. One reason that
naming the SCB is important is that naming it allows it to
“become a societal issue capable of scientific study and
intervention.”312 This article proposes that social science
researchers and lawyers work together to gather
empirically-sound data on the SCB.
The SCB has not yet been named as such in any court
opinion, but it should be. The naming of the SCB and the
underlying second child stereotype is an important legal
and normative endeavor that will advance the larger project
of FRD litigation and scholarship—transforming normative
claims of caregivers in the workforce into “factual claims”313
and ending discrimination against them—by adding to the
“long-standing, and ongoing, debate about how hard Title
VII should press against the social norms that prescribe
distinct sex and family roles for men and women.”314

310. Id. (internal citations omitted).
311. Id. at 329.
312. Id.
313. See, e.g., Beyond the Maternal Wall, supra note 8, at 113.
314. Franklin, supra note 9, at 1380.

